

















































































city	 spaces,	 as	 a	 means	 of	 deepening	 understanding	 of	 Somali	 social,	 political	 and	 spatial	
organisation.	 In	 advancing	 this	 proposed	 shift,	 the	 thesis	 scrutinises	 the	 nexus	 between	
governance	and	segregation	 in	Hargeisa,	drawing	on	urban	ethnographic	methods,	 interview	





the	 complex	 intersection	 of	 state	 institutions,	 clan	 and	 sub-clan	 allegiance	 and	 traditional	
authorities.	My	analysis	thus	situates	recent	urban	governance	and	conflicts	over	land	in	a	longer	
history	 of	 municipal	 governance,	 urban	 land	 administration	 and	 conflict	 adjudication.	 This	
historical	 perspective	 is	 important	 for	 the	 understanding	 of	 how	 segregation	 has	 been	













































































































































































































































authority	 and	 spatial	 form.	 The	 shift	 in	 focus	 from	 the	 national	 to	 the	 urban	 level	 is	
fundamentally	important	because	the	local	and	more	specifically	the	urban	is	the	site	where	the	
vast	majority	 of	 people	 “come	 into	 contact	with	 ‘the	 state’	 and	 this	 is	where	many	 of	 their	
images	 of	 the	 state	 are	 forged”(Gupta,	 1995,	 p.	 376).	Moreover,	 almost	 40%	 of	 the	 Somali	
population	now	live	in	cities,1	with	an	estimated	annual	growth	of	4.6%	between	2010-2015	(The	
World	Factbook,	2015b).	The	 trend	 is	expected	 to	 rise	 further	 sharply	as	 current	projections	
predict	urban	population	growth	of	270%	by	2050	–	See	table	1	below	(UN,	2014).	Related	to	
this,	 focussing	 on	 the	 city	 can	 enable	 us	 to	 examine	 the	 everyday	 practices	 and	 quality	 of	
interaction	between	the	people	and	the	local	state	more	closely	and	hence	gain	comprehensive	
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point	 out	 the	 relative	 difference	 in	 peace	 and	 stability	 between	 Somaliland	 and	 the	 rest	 of	





and	 postcolonial	 administrations.	 For	 this	 reason,	 it	 is	 also	 important	 to	 go	 beyond	 existing	
																																								 																				
2	 Akils	 and	 Sultans	 are	 traditional	 authorities	 mainly	 found	 in	 Somaliland.	 The	 Sultans	 are	 higher	 in	
hierarchy	as	he	is	the	leader	of	a	larger	clan	conglomerate.	The	Akils	are	chiefs	who	are	often	involved	in	
the	day	today	governance	and	mediation	of	clan	politics.				
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debates	over	 'hybridity'	 to	understand	urban	 institutions	and	 their	 role	 in	 the	emergence	of	
Hargeisa’s	 spatial	 character.	 The	 specific	 conflicts	 examined	 in	 this	 thesis	 do	 not	 point	 to	
integrated/fused	local	state	institutions,	but	rather	to	plurality,	coexistence	and	contradiction.		
1.1 Why	Hargeisa?		
This	 study	 focuses	 on	 Hargeisa,	 Somaliland	 (See	 map	 of	 the	 city	 on	 page	 13)3,	 which	 is	 a	
particularly	interesting	site	for	a	study	of	urban	form	and	spatial	dynamics,	given	the	paucity	of	
existing	scholarship,	and	the	potential	 for	research	on	the	neglected	municipal	authorities	to	
contribute	 to	broader	debates	about	 state	hybridity	and	 institutional	pluralism,	as	well	as	 to	
debates	 over	African	 cities	 and	 segregation.	 The	 study	was	hosted	 and	 co-sponsored	by	 the	


















an	 authoritarian	 governance	 of	 the	 city	 mediated	 by	 clan	 authorities.	 The	 importance	 of	
Hargeisa	both	in	administrative	and	economic	terms	declined	during	the	postcolonial	civil	and	
military	 period,	 when	 it	 was	 significantly	 overshadowed	 by	 Mogadishu,	 Somalia’s	 capital.	
																																								 																				
3	See	also	the	map	of	Somaliland	on	page	14.	
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Administratively,	 the	 colonial-era	 authoritarian	 governance	 of	 the	 city	 mediated	 by	 clan	
authorities	continued	to	shape	the	segregation	of	urban	space	in	Hargeisa.	In	instances	where	
the	authoritarian	government	was	able	to	create	an	environment	in	which	cosmopolitan	spaces	
emerged,	 these	 were	 then	 subsequently	 undone	 by	 the	 reintroduction	 of	 clan-based	 state	
politics,	which	by	implication	made	clan-	protection	essential.	Hargeisa	regained	its	importance	
in	the	region	when	Somaliland	reinstated	its	independence	unilaterally	from	the	rest	of	Somalia	
in	 1991,	 reclaiming	 its	 statehood	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 the	 colonial	 administrative	 boundaries	
developed	over	a	period	of	85	years	under	British	colonial	rule.	During	this	period	segregation	
in	the	city	continued	along	the	same	clan-based	lines	primarily	because	of	the	state’s	inability	to	
guarantee	 the	 security	 of	 urban	 citizens.	 All	 of	 this	 makes	 it	 ideal	 to	 extend	 or	 question	
(celebratory)	 debates	 of	 hybrid	 peace-building	 by	 focusing	 on	 neglected	 city	 space	 and	
authority,	where	 subjects/citizens	 encounter	 the	 local	 state	 on	 a	 daily	 basis,	 and	where	 the	
manifestation	of	lack	of	trust	has	repeatedly	fostered	a	trend	towards	spatial	segregation.			
It	is	important	here	to	note	that	clan	identity	shapes	not	only	the	relationship	between	the	state	
and	 the	 public	 but	 it	 also	 plays	 a	 crucial	 role	 in	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 life	 of	 residents	 in	
Hargeisa.	 For	 instance,	 employment	 opportunities	 are	 to	 a	 significant	 degree	 influenced	 by	
kinship.	 Justifications	 for	 this	 include	 that	 there	 are	 social	 expectations	which	 bind	 business	
owners,	shareholders	and	or	senior	officials	to	take	part	in	their	clan’s	economic	empowerment	




intersection	 between	 urban	 governance	 and	 the	 formation	 and	 perpetuation	 of	 clan	 based	
segregation	in	the	city.		
Hargeisa	is	divided	into	five	administrative	districts	namely	Ahmed	Dhagax4,	Mohamoud	Haybe,	






than	 sub-clans.	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 used	 the	 language	 commonly	 spoken	and	understood	 in	 the	 streets	
rather	than	the	texts	which	refer	Isaaq	as	one	clan.	My	reference	should	not	however	be	taken	as	though	
I	am	suggesting	Isaaq	sub-clans	are	unrelated	and	are	independent	from	each	other	as	clan	units.			




and	 Farah	Nur	while	 the	 latter	 is	mainly	 found	 in	 a	neighbourhood	popularly	 known	as	 Isha	
Borama	 as	 well	 as	 other	 sub-districts	 in	 the	 North	 and	Western	 parts	 of	 the	 city.	 Garhajis	
(Eidagale	 and	 Habar	 Yonis)	 populates	 Mohamoud	 Haybe	 District,	 consisting	 of	 various	 sub-










The	 above	description	of	 the	 clan	based	 settlement	pattern	 in	Hargeisa	 is	meant	 to	provide	
overall	 picture	 about	 how	 clans	 are	 predominantly	 distributed	 over	 space.	 It	 is	 however	
important	to	point	out	that	population	distribution	and	space	identity	in	Hargeisa	is	contested	

























intersection	 between	 governance	 and	 popular	 responses	 to	 insecurity	 and	mistrust	 of	 state	
institutions	 to	 explain	 the	 reproduction	of	 segregation	over	 time.	 The	 study	has	 a	 particular	
focus	 on	 urban	 land	 administration	 and	 conflict	 adjudication	 and	 their	 interface	with	 urban	
development	as	a	means	to	shed	light	on	the	spatial	outcome	of	clan-based	politics	in	the	city.		
The	key	overarching	question	in	this	thesis	is:	what	are	the	key	historical	processes	and	recent	
socio-political	 dynamics	 underpinning	 Hargeisa’s	 spatial	 character	 as	 clan-based	 segregated	
urban	space;	how	do	people	navigate	the	terrain	of	urban	institutions;	and	how	does	this	shape	
the	making	and	remaking	of	urban	space	in	Hargeisa?	As	the	thesis	examines	particular	aspects	








• How	do	 people	 navigate	 the	 terrain	 of	 urban	 institutions	 and	 how	does	 this	
shape	the	making	and	remaking	of	urban	spaces	in	Hargeisa?	
• What	are	the	security	implications	of	unresolved	urban	land	conflicts	in	the	city	








urban	 segregation	 in	 both	 colonial	 and	 postcolonial	 times.	 I	 elaborate	 debates	 over	 hybrid	




















deepening	 understanding	 into	 the	 legitimacy	 crises	 the	 Somali	 state	 suffered	 for	 a	 long	 and	
hence	 fail	 to	 inform	public	policy	and	urban	governance	practices	 that	are	adequate	 to	alter	
public	choices	of	residential	places,	which	are	currently	perpetuating	segregation.	
In	 the	 third	 chapter,	 I	 discuss	 the	methodological	 approach	 for	 this	 study,	 emphasising	 the	
importance	 of	 urban	 ethnographic	 methods	 and	 historical	 sources	 to	 complement	 formal	


















section,	 I	 discuss	 the	 post-conflict	 state’s	 attempt	 to	 re-establish	 local	 and	 municipal	






history	 of	 operating	 from	 top-down,	 and	 I	 explore	 and	 how	 these	 shape	 public	 perception	
towards	the	state.	The	chapter	begins	by	exploring	the	colonial	subversion	and	alteration	of	the	
indigenous	approach	to	land	management.	I	show	that	the	colonial	administration’s	approach	
to	 land	management	 contravened	 local	 customs	on	 resource	management	based	on	mutual	
understanding	informed	by	a	set	of	unwritten	rules.	It	introduced	a	top-down	land	management	
with	 little	 or	 no	 consultation,	 which	 undermined	 the	 prior	 voluntary	 compliance	 with	 rules	
governing	natural	resources	including	land.	As	Hargeisa	became	a	critical	site	where	new	urban	
land	 regulations	 were	 enforced	 most	 visibly	 during	 the	 colonial	 period,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	
expropriation	of	land	in	Hargeisa	affected	residents	in	two	important	ways.	Firstly,	those	whose	
land	was	expropriated	had	no	alternative	but	 to	negotiate	space	 in	areas	populated	by	 their	




undermined	 the	acceptability	of	 the	new	urban	 land	management	 regime.	The	chapter	 then	
discusses	 postcolonial	 attempts	 to	 bring	 about	 change	 in	 the	 land	 management	 regime,	
primarily	 as	 a	 tool	 for	 boosting	 economic	development.	 I	 argue	 that	 the	postcolonial	 state’s	











I	 argue	 that	 post-conflict	 attempts	 aimed	 at	 improving	 the	 legal	 framework	 for	 urban	 land	
administration	 have	 not	 been	 successful,	 as	 the	 newly	 enacted	 laws	 are	 characterised	 by	
ambiguity,	 further	 undermining	 public	 trust.	 This	 top-down	 land	 management	 was	 further	




operating	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 research,	 supposedly	 regulated	 initially	 through	 ad	 hoc	 local	
government	 committees	 and	 the	 statutory	 judicial	 system	but	 later	 through	 the	Urban	 Land	
Commission	(a	special	tribunal	for	urban	land).		The	Commission	was	set	up	in	2009	to	mediate	
and	 adjudicate	 urban	 land	 conflicts,	 but	 which	 was	 shaped	 in	 practice	 by	 a	 plurality	 of	
institutions.	The	chapter	begins	by	discussing	key	issues	in	accessibility	to	urban	land	and	the	





conflicts	 are	 exacerbated	 by	 the	 inability	 of	 the	 plural	 justice	 system	 to	 deal	 with	 them	
adequately.	In	the	third	and	fourth	sections,	I	discuss	urban	land	conflict	adjudication,	shaped	
by	the	plural	justice	system.	I	argue	that	attempts	to	improve	the	dispute	mediation	mechanism	
have	 shown	 institutional	 gaps	 in	 how	 the	 state	 deals	 with	 land	 issues.	 While	 the	 Land	
Commission	deals	with	conflicts	among	city	residents,	it	rarely	addresses	disputes	between	the	




















and	 means	 through	 which	 urban	 land	 conflicts	 are	 adjudicated	 play	 a	 key	 role	 in	 the	
entrenchment	of	the	city’s	segregated	spatial	character.	
In	 the	 eighth	 chapter,	 I	 discuss	 the	 impact	 of	 urban	 land	 conflicts	 on	 security.	 The	 chapter	
focuses	on	a	case	study	in	which	the	government	was	involved	with	land	conflict	at	a	military	
base	 located	 in	 Eastern	Hargeisa.	 Locals	 also	 claimed	 the	 land	 on	which	 the	military	 base	 is	
located.	 The	 dispute	 flared	 up	 after	 the	 government	 decided	 to	 compensate	 a	 prominent	
Ethiopian	politician,	from	whom	it	confiscated	land,	by	giving	him	rights	to	land	located	in	the	
contested	area.	This	 led	 to	violent	 resistance	 in	which	seven	people	 lost	 their	 lives,	and	 four	
others	were	injured.	The	chapter	consists	of	three	sections.	In	the	first	section,	I	provide	a	brief	





result	 from	the	 lack	of	credible	mediation	and	resolution	mechanisms	 for	cases	 in	which	 the	
state	is	one	of	the	disputants.	 I	argue	that	the	absence	of	credible	mechanisms	to	adjudicate	
land	 conflicts	 in	 cases	 where	 the	 state	 is	 one	 of	 the	 disputing	 parties	 frequently	 produces	
insecurity	in	urban	contexts,	because	of	the	way	the	state	manipulates	the	justice	system.	I	argue	
that	 this	 erodes	 public	 trust,	 and	 hence	 plays	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 production	 and	










This	 chapter	 elaborates	 debates	 in	 the	 literature	 over	 hybrid	 governance	 to	 show	 their	
inadequacy	for	illuminating	urban	form	and	spatial	character	of	cities	in	Somali/land.	It	seeks	to	
develop	 new	 perspectives	 on	 understanding	 the	 spatial	 character	 of	 cities	 in	 Somali/land	






















insurgent	political	 organisation,	 the	 Somali	National	Movement	 (SNM),	was	established	by	 a	
group	of	mainly	Isaaq	politicians.	Their	stated	objective	was	to	liberate	Somalia	from	the	grip	of	
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Mohamed	 Siad	 Barre’s	 dictatorship.	 Soon	 after	 its	 launch7,	 SNM	 established	 itself	 along	 the	
border	with	Ethiopia	particularly	North	Western	and	Togdheer	regions	amid	hostilities	between	
Ethiopia	 and	 Somalia.	 It	 started	waging	 sporadic	 guerrilla	 attacks	on	 the	 Somali	 government	
forces	based	along	the	borders	and	further	inside.	The	response	of	the	Somali	state	was	heavy	
handed	as	it	often	visited	wrath	on	the	civil	population	(mainly	the	Isaaq	clans)	in	the	North	who	
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wars	 formed	 as	 part	 of	 the	 state-building	 processes.	 More	 importantly,	 these	 wars	 can	 be	
understood	as	a	legitimation	struggle	in	which	each	side	of	the	conflict	was	trying	to	address	the	
legitimacy	crisis	which	led	to	the	disintegration	of	the	Somali	state	between	1988-1991.	Before	





and	 introduced	 state	 and	 societal	 structures”	 (Boege	 et	 al.,	 2009b,	 p.	 17).	 More	
comprehensively,	 Hagmann	 and	 Hoehne	 define	 hybrid	 political	 orders	 as	 the	 “sum	 of	
institutionalised,	yet	dynamic	power	relations	that	one	can	empirically	grasp	at	a	given	time	and	
place,	 [involving]	 international	 legal	 arrangements	 as	well	 as	 everyday	 practices	 of	 ordinary	
people	and	processes	at	the	 local	 level,	often	across	but	rarely	without	reference	to	national	
boundaries”	 (Hagmann	 and	 Hoehne,	 2009,	 p.	 44).	 The	 use	 of	 the	 words	 contradiction	 and	
coexistence	 are	 important	 here,	 as	 they	 show	 that	 traditional	 institutions	 may	 act	 in	




Regions,	 and	 after	 he	 was	 elected	 as	 President	 of	 Somaliland	 on	 18th	 May	 1991-1993	 when	 he	 was	
replaced	by	Mohamed	Ibrahim	Egal.				




may	 also	 be	 contradictions	 when	 the	 existence	 of	 traditional	 institutions	 works	 against	 the	
desires	of	the	state	to	discharge	its	local	and	international	obligations.	The	dynamic	nature	of	











between	 “domestic	 needs	 and	 external	 demands”,	 supported	 and	 sustained	 locally	 but	 also	
aimed	at	reaching	sovereignty.	At	the	end	of	the	Cold	War	in	early	1990s,	many	African	states	








and	Péclard,	2010).	According	 to	Hagmann	and	Hoehne	 (2009),	 the	state	 failure	 thesis	has	a	




and	 others	 are	 weak.	 Fourthly,	 the	 abovementioned	 assumption	 inherently	 leads	 to	 the	
conceptualisation	 of	 intervention	 mechanisms	 relying	 on	 set	 of	 indicators	 developed	 under	
these	assumptions	in	order	to	analyse	and	arrive	at	a	solution	for	the	“failing	states”.		





(Hagmann	 and	 Hoehne,	 2009).	 For	 instance,	 Somali	 territories	 represent	 an	 example	 of	 an	
emergent	trend	of	governance	arrangements	negotiated	at	the	local	level	(Menkhaus,	2006b,	
Menkhaus,	 2006a).	 The	 manner	 in	 which	 such	 orders	 develop	 differs	 from	 one	 context	 to	
another,	 indeed,	 	such	negotiation	“refers	 to	the	dynamic	and,	at	 least	partly,	undetermined	
processes	of	state	(de-construction”	(Hagmann	and	Péclard,	2010,	p.	544)	which	takes	place	at	
both	 the	 local	and	national	 levels	 (Renders	and	Terlinden,	2010).	 In	states	where	centralised	
formal	institutions	are	non-existent,	unable	or	unwilling	to	reach	all	parts	of	their	territory,	such	









what	went	wrong	and	how	an	alternative	option	 could	be	mapped	 for	 Somali	 state-building	
raged	 among	 academics.	 These	 debates	 often	 focussed	 on	 the	 national	 level.	 The	 object	 of	






focus	 on	 political	 and	 cultural	 dimensions	 of	 the	 concept,	while	 overlooking	 its	 socio-spatial	
utility	and	 the	 factors	underpinning	 such	utilities.	 The	use	of	 clan	as	analytical	 frame	can	be	
traced	 to	 Lewis’s	 seminal	 works	 in	 the	 late	 1950s	 on	 Somaliland	 (1958,	 1961).	 For	 Lewis,	
clannism	was	and	remains	to	be	pervasive	among	the	Somalis,	as	clan	 identity	 is	acquired	at	

















tool	 for	 understanding	 the	political	 and	 social	 dynamics	 underpinning	 conflict.	His	 argument	




Somali	 administrations	 during	 both	 the	 democratic	 and	military	 rules	 as	 being	 far	 from	 the	
Somali	 reality	 (Lewis,	 2008a).	Here,	 kinship	 is	 presented	 as	 an	organising	principle	pervasive	
enough	that	even	the	Islamists,	whose	war	on	clan	was	thus	far	the	toughest,	were	unable	to	
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Somali	nationalism	evidently	 retains	 its	 segmentary	character	and	has	not	been	 transformed	
into	a	modern	organic	mode”	 (Lewis,	1989,	p.	578).	He	argues	 further	 that	 this	 is	 so	despite	
rejection	 by	 “urbanised	 and	Westernised	 Somalis	 [who]	maintain	 that	 discrimination	 is	 'old-
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the	existence	of	a	 common	culture,	 language,	 religion	and	appearance	as	 some	of	 the	other	
more	legitimate	tools	of	analysis	that	could	be	used	to	understand	Somali	society.	In	opposing	
those	who	present	 clan	as	a	means	 to	 resolve	 the	political	 crisis	 in	Somalia,	 this	perspective	
places	the	blame	on	bad	leadership	and	exclusionary	politics	(Samatar,	1997).	This	suggests	that	
political	 conflict	 in	 the	 Somali	 territories	 cannot	 be	 understood	 as	 being	 the	 result	 of	 an	
intrinsically	 violent	 culture	 but	 rather	 as	 the	 absence	 of	 a	 civil	 way	 to	 address	 political	 and	
economic	concerns.	Samatar	(2006b)	argues	that	the	mobilisation	of	people	and	resources	for	









clan	 identity	 is	 context	bound	and	 can	be	overridden	by	 social	 and	political	 occurrences.	He	
further	points	out	that	recent	events	in	which	the	Islamic	courts	were	able	to	mobilise	cross	clan	
support	for	their	efforts	shows	that	clan	is	not	the	big	elephant	in	Somali	politics	and	it	can	be	
overcome	 in	 many	 instances	 through	 nationalist	 or	 religious	 means.	 In	 other	 words,	 both	






suggestion	 inherent	 in	 this	 view	 is	 that	 clan	 ideals	 and	 identity	 are	 contextual	 and	 can	 be	
configured	and	reconfigured	by	political,	economic	and	social	events	and	occurrences.		




land	 is	 put	 forward	 as	 being	 a	 drastic	 measure	 cutting	 communities	 from	 each	 other	 and	
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therefore	 altering	 their	 clan-based	 interdependence.	 Secondly,	 the	 role	 of	 the	 colonial	
administration	 in	 using	 and	 abusing	 the	 clan-based	 political	 structures	 through	 a	 process	 of	
formalisation	in	which	the	state	imposed	itself	on	its	subjects	is	overlooked.	She	argues	that	this	
reinvention	of	 traditional	 institutions	by	 the	colonial	administration	altered	 the	 fundamental	
tenets	of	Somali	political	organisation	and	dented	its	image.		Equally,	Besteman	(1998,	p.	110)	








disaster	 as	 Somali	 cultural	 values	 and	 the	 political	 exploitation	 of	 clan	 identities	will	 collide.	
While	this	perspective	has	successfully	provided	alternative	understandings	of	Somali	social	and	
political	organisation,	like	the	previous	perspective,	it	also	fails	to	elaborate	the	utilities	of	clan	
in	 the	 spatial	 character	 of	 cities	 in	 the	 Somali	 territories	 and	 its	 role	 in	 urban	 governance.	
Moreover,	critics	of	this	perspective	point	to	the	usefulness	of	clan	as	an	organisational	asset	
and	readily	point	to	the	clan-based	segregation	apparent	 in	almost	all	 	aspects	of	the	Somali	







This	 argument	 against	 an	 essentialist	 view	 of	 clan	 is	 further	 reinforced	 when	 the	 practices	
committed	in	the	name	of	clan	are	separated	from	the	clan	as	a	mode	of	social	organisation.	For	
instance	 Samatar	 (2006a,	 p.	 57)	 distinguishes	 clanism	 “as	 the	 political	 mechanism	 for	
manipulating	 community	 sentiment	 along	 sectarian	 lines”	 from	 clan	 as	 the	 “genealogical	
differences	[that]	have	been	one	of	the	elements	of	Somali	tradition,	but…never	 induced	the	
kind	of	mayhem	that	mar	[the	Somali]	society”	now.	Samatar	(1997)	seeks	to	validate	this	point	
in	his	comparative	study	of	Botswana	and	Somalia	where	he	argues	 that	 these	 two	societies	







While	 the	 author	 does	 not	 focus	 on	 the	 urban	 level,	 the	 same	point	 could	 be	made	 for	 the	
formation	 of	 spatially	 segregated	 cities	 in	 Somaliland,	 which	 are,	 as	 will	 be	 argued	 in	 the	


















Barre	would	not	 fight	among	 themselves	 (Farah	and	Lewis,	1997).	A	major	dimension	of	 the	
political	 conflicts	 in	 Somaliland	 which	 was	 not	 captured	 in	 the	 literature	 relates	 to	 an	
observation	made	by	Menkhaus	(2003)	in	relation	to	Southern	Somalia.	He	argues	that	when	
conflicts	 devolve	 in	 a	 lower	 level	 of	 the	 genealogical	 chain,	 the	 scale	 and	 the	 impact	 of	 the	
conflict	 reduces.	 This	 observation	may	 also	well	 explain	 an	 important	 factor	 that	 expedited	
peace	 in	 Somaliland,	 as	 clans	 had	 become	war	 weary	 during	 the	 final	 years	 of	 the	 political	
conflict	and	could	no	longer	afford	to	sustain	the	war.	The	political	class	in	both	camps	had	also	
realised	 that	 their	 days	 were	 numbered	 before	 the	 public	 turned	 their	 back	 on	 them.	 This	























have	 a	 fundamental	 impact	 on	 the	 country’s	 political	 landscape.	 Even	 though	 the	 Borama	
conference	 was	 more	 to	 do	 with	 state-building	 than	 peace-building,	 the	 existence	 of	 the	
different	militias	loyal	to	their	respective	clans	and	other	freelancers	who	were	bent	on	making	













process	of	delegating	 responsibility	 to	 the	elders	during	 the	colonial	era	when	Akils	 (Chiefs),	
were	 paid	 to	 perform	 some	 state	 functions.	 In	 post-colonial	 times,	 traditional	 systems	were	
again	used	by	the	state	in	order	to	bring	about	law	and	order	among	the	populace,	particularly	
in	rural	areas.	What	is	unique	about	the	current	hybrid	political	order	in	Somaliland	is,	perhaps,	
the	 scale	 rather	 than	 the	 substance	 of	 the	 mixture.	 In	 other	 words,	 the	 extent	 to	 which	
traditional	systems	are	formalised	and	constitutionally	sanctioned	is	new.	In	the	past,	however,	
Akils	and	pro-government	elders	were	also	key	instruments	through	which	the	state	maintained	
law	and	order	 in	 a	 politically	 charged	environment	where	most	 of	 the	 ‘people	 regarded	 the	







it	 was	 underpinned	 by	 individual	 agency.	 Indeed,	 this	 diversity	was	 characteristic	 of	 African	
contexts	more	 broadly,	 as	 some	 chiefs	willingly	 supported	 the	 colonial	 powers	while	 others	
opposed.	According	to	von	Trotha	(1996,	p.	80)	“this	diversity	was	transformed	and	subsumed	
into	 a	 unifying	 administrative	 structure....organised	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 institutional	 innovations	
following	three	principles:	those	of	devolution,	hierarchy	and	the	administrative”		(von	Trotha,	
1996,	 p.	 80).	 Firstly,	 the	 principal	 of	 devolved	 powers	 upheld	 	 the	 colonial	 state’s	 right	 of	
‘appointment	and	 removal	of	 chiefs	as	 its	 sole	prerogative	 (von	Trotha,	1996);	 secondly,	 the	
principal	 of	 hierarchy	 meant	 that	 the	 colonial	 government	 could	 invent	 and/or	 modify	 the	
institution	 of	 chieftaincy	 to	 serve	 as	 auxiliary	 communicative	means	 between	 itself	 and	 the	
population;	and	thirdly	the	principal	of	administration	underpinned	the	colonial	government’s	









Even	 though	 the	 customary	 institutions	 were	 not	 limited	 to	 only	 Akils,	 they	 became	 the	
preferred	colonial	means	of	governance	in	the	Protectorate	during	British	rule.	The	home-grown	
Sultanate	system	of	public	authority,	which	had	better	social	standing	and	legitimacy	in	the	eyes	
of	 the	 public,	was	marginalised	 to	 a	 significant	 degree.	 	Unlike	Akils,	 the	 public	 authority	 of	
Sultans	was	not	a	colonial	invention.	This	is	not	to	say	that	the	Sultans	were	totally	outside	the	
state	but	rather	the	level	of	Akils’	engagement	was	pronounced.	One	of	the	reasons	why	Akils	
were	 preferred	 as	 an	 administrative	 instrument	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 they	 could	 cover	 wider	
geographical	 areas	 by	 their	 sheer	 far	 greater	 number	 than	 the	 Sultans	 who	 were	 few	 and	
represented	 bigger	 clan	 groupings.	 According	 to	 Lewis	 (1955,	 p.	 585),	 the	 institution	 of	
chieftaincy	 (i.e.	 Akil)	 was	 highly	 revered	 or	 feared.	 He	 observes	 that	 “chief's	 glance	 [was]	
referred	to	as	(il	kulul)	'the	burning	eye'	…	his	person	is	so	strongly	endowed	with	power	that	
among	some	closely	related	tribes	it	is	usual	for	a	visiting	chief	to	avoid	a	face	to	face	encounter	







and	 clans	 were	 given	 the	 opportunity	 to	 nominate	 an	 Akil	 and	 present	 their	 choice	 to	 the	
government,	 while	 the	 second	 was	 based	 on	 government	 selection	 where	 the	 District	
Commissioner	(DC)	appointed	the	Akil	without	necessarily	consulting	the	clan.	Deceased	Akils	
were	inherited	in	many	cases	by	their	next	of	kin.	The	colonial	administrators	did	not	consider	
the	 Akil	 system	 they	 introduced	 as	 wholly	 traditional	 but	 they	 were	 hopeful	 that	 it	 would	
transform	into	an	indigenous	form	of	governance	having	features	and	properties	of	traditional	
leadership.	The	primary	administrative	function	of	this	institution	was	basically	determined	by	
the	 colonial	 administrators	 and	 most	 importantly	 the	 District	 Commissioner	 whose	 orders	
																																								 																				
11	Dia	 is	a	blood	money	and	a	dia	group	 is	comprised	of	members	of	a	clan	who	collectively	pay	blood	
money	 in	 cases	 where	 one	 of	 their	 members	 causes	 death	 within	 or	 outside	 the	 clan	 accidently	 or	
deliberately.	
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outlined	 the	 duties	 and	 responsibilities	 of	 the	 Akils.	 In	 other	words,	 Akils	were	 government	
agents	as	well	as	traditional	authorities.	Even	though	Akils	were	seen	as	colonial	stooges	they	




reason,	 among	 others,	 Akils’	 intervention	 often	 necessitated	 that	 people	 of	 the	 same	 clan	





case	 for	 going	 beyond	 hybridity	 (Hoehne,	 2013,	 Hoehne,	 2011).	 Furthermore,	 the	 role	 of	
customary	 institutions	 in	 the	hybrid	order	can	be	critiqued	 in	a	number	of	ways.	The	 idea	of	
hybridity	evokes	an	image	in	which	state	institutions	are	made	of	two	forms	of	governance	that	
are	nicely	fitting	and	merged	–	it	is	cast	as	a	magic	medicine	that	could	revive	the	Somali	state	
or	other	African	states.	Put	 it	differently,	 the	role	of	 the	customary	 institutions	 in	 the	hybrid	
order	 is	over-emphasised	and	represented	as	the	missing	 link	that	can	explain	the	difference	
between	successful	governance	and	 failed	attempts	of	 top	down	 international	 interventions.	
This	 representation	 seems	 exaggerated	 and	might	 in	many	 cases	 jar	with	 the	 reality	 on	 the	
ground.	 For	 instance,	 one	 could	 question	 the	 extent	 to	which	 institutions	 in	 Somaliland	 are	
hybrid.	Apart	from	the	Guurti,	the	house	of	elders,	there	is	no	notable	national	level	institution	





by	 the	 political	 elites	 in	 the	 executive	 branch	 of	 the	 government.	 For	 instance,	 traditional	
authorities	 in	 Somaliland	 were	 accused	 of	 transforming	 into	 institutions	 that	 undermine	
democratic	progress	and	hence	further	exacerbate	the	already	bleak	image	of	state	legitimacy	
(Hashi,	2005).	Other	sceptics	of	the	 long	term	applicability	of	the	hybrid	political	order	argue	
that	 hybrid	 state-building	 processes	 have	 outlived	 their	 usefulness	 and	 what	 remains	 now	
“undermines	democratic	progress…and	legitimate	authority	of	the	state	institutions	as	well	as	





when	 the	 tradition	 and	 the	modern	 are	 combined	 to	 form	one	political	 order.	 For	 instance,	
traditional	systems	may	be	effective	at	 the	 local	 level	but	 they	might	be	 less	effective	at	 the	
national	level	and	lead	to	divisions	between	clans,	as	their	authority	is	limited	to	their	particular	
clan	of	belonging.	Traditional	systems	also	have	a	tendency	of	being	biasing	against	women	and	
young	people.	 	 If	 they	continue	to	be	a	significant	part	of	 the	state	structures,	 they	could	all	
present	 a	 threat	 to	 the	 possibility	 of	 democratic	 and	 equitable	 participation	 in	 the	 political	
processes	where	women	have	 the	same	rights	 in	 state	affairs	as	 their	male	counterparts.	As	




state-building,	 in	 which	 the	 modern	 structures	 of	 the	 state	 dominate	 the	 incorporated	
traditional	structure,	such	as	in	the	case	of	the	Guurti.	In	spite	of	its	formal	inclusion	in	the	state	
structure,	 the	 current	 political	 dispensation	 in	 Somaliland	 makes	 the	 Guurti	 functionally	
marginal.	 This	 undermines	 the	 quest	 for	 state	 legitimacy,	 which	 was	 the	 main	 reason	 why	
traditional	 institutions	were	 incorporated	 in	 the	 first	place.	The	Guurti’s	 standing	among	 the	
public	 is	 vulnerable.	 They	 are	 not	 elected	 and	 they	 have	 on	many	 occasions	 prevented	 the	
democratic	process	by	either	extending	their	term,	or	that	of	the	executive.	Moreover,	Guurti	is	
traditionally	 a	 dynamic	 institution	 in	 which	 any	 male	 capable	 of	 commanding	 respect	 can	
represent	the	clan	and	perform	the	functions	known	for	Guurti	i.e.	mediation	of	disputes	and	




of	 interaction	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 people	 and	 the	 spatial	 manifestation	 of	 such	
interaction,	 it	 is	 crucial	 to	 go	 beyond	 existing	 debates	 over	 'hybridity'	 to	 understand	 urban	
spatial	form	and	the	unban	institutions	that	shape	settlement	patterns.	The	argument	here	is	
that	the	literatures	on	urban	segregation,	state	legitimacy	and	trust	are	more	able	to	provide	
new	understandings	of	 the	dynamics	 that	 shape	 the	 spatial	 character	 of	Hargeisa	 and	other	
Somali	cities.	While	hybridity	generally	focuses	on	the	nature	of	state	 institutions	and	can	be	
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or	 actor	 is	 legitimate	 to	 the	 extent	 that	 people	 regard	 it	 as	 satisfactory	 and	 believe	 that	 no	
available	alternative	would	be	vastly	 superior”.	 The	OECD	 (2010),	differentiates	at	 least	 four	
forms	 of	 state	 legitimacy.	 First	 is	 ‘process	 legitimacy’,	 which	 is	 about	 setting	 the	 rules	 of	
engagement	between	citizens	and	the	state.	Second	is	‘performance	legitimacy’,	which	is	about	
the	state’s	performance	against	a	set	of	measures	believed	to	indicate	level	of	performance	i.e.	
service	 delivery.	 Third	 is	 legitimacy	 that	 emerges	 from	 shared	 beliefs	 and	 social	 practices	









accountable	 and	 transparent	 processes	 and	 instruments	 of	 power	 (Fukuyama,	 2004a).	 The	
second	 approach	 draws	 heavily	 on	 Durkheimian	 state-building	 perspectives	 and	 it	 places	
emphasis	not	on	the	physical	structures	and	institutions	of	the	state,	but	rather	the	political	and	
social	aspects	of	the	state	i.e.	the	people	who	constitute	the	powers	in	institutional	structures	




2004	 ),	while	 in	 the	 legitimacy	 approach,	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	 extent	 to	which	
democracy	exists	are	seen	as		factors	enhancing	legitimacy	(Fukuyama,	2004b).		
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The	 literature	 also	makes	other	distinctions	 in	 how	 to	understand	 the	 concept.	 For	 instance	
Gilley	 (2006)	makes	a	distinction	between	objective	and	 subjective	 legitimacy.	 The	 former	 is	
based	on	impartial	observation	of	state	behaviour,	how	people	view	the	state	as	well	as	their	
level	of	 trust,	whereas	the	 latter	 is	based	on	subjective	experience	and	 interpretation	by	the	
opinion	givers.	The	policy	implications	of	these	different	analytical	perspectives	on	legitimacy	
take	two	forms,	descriptive	and	prescriptive,	as	mapped	by	Hoffman	and	Kirk	(2013).	The	former	
places	 the	 emphasis	 on	 understanding	 legitimacy	 by	 looking	 at	 the	 specifics	 of	 beliefs	 and	
perceptions	and	how	this	shapes	the	way	people	relate	to	and	assess	the	state	(Andersen,	2011).	
The	latter	places	emphasis	on	normative	indicators	based	on	universal	guidelines	(Bellina	et	al.,	








which	 both	 the	 input	 and	 output	 as	 well	 as	 the	 practices	 and	 cultures	 which	 shape	 their	
interaction	are	constituted	(Lieberherr).							
State	 legitimacy	 is	 associated	with	 effective	 institutional	 development.	 Positive	 attributes	 of	
high	state	 legitimacy	 include	 increased	voluntary	engagement	 in	governance,	as	well	as	non-
coercive	 compliance	 with	 rules	 and	 regulations.	 In	 other	 words,	 legitimacy	 is	 believed	 to	




legitimacy	 through	 elections	 is	 that	 people’s	 perception	 is	 to	 a	 significant	 degree	 shaped	by	
which	political	party	they	identify	with.	The	author	observes	that	in	many	African	countries,	it	is	
likely	 that	 losers	 of	 elections	 may	 display	 negative	 perceptions	 towards	 state	 institutions	
whereas	those	who	voted	for	the	winning	party	are	likely	to	exhibit	more	trust	in	the	state.	This	
may	 be	 particularly	 pronounced	 in	 cases	 where	 state	 and	 party	 institutions	 are	merged,	 or	
where	parties	have	a	constituency	that	is	defined	by	regional,	ethnic	(or	in	the	Somali	case),	clan	
loyalties.	 Similarly,	 winners	 are	 less	 likely	 to	 defend	 civic	 rights	 than	 losers	 if	 such	 action	 is	










According	 Etzioni	 (2011),	 legitimacy	 is,	 more	 often	 than	 not,	 underpinned	 or	 informed	 by	
normative	values	and	social	practices,	“subject	to	moral	dialogues”	but	not	necessarily	produced	
by	them.	In	many	cases,	such	moral	dialogues	inform	the	understanding	of	what	is	considered	
and	 what	 is	 not	 considered	 just.	 But	 Buckley	 (2013)	 problematises	 this,	 underscoring	 the	
importance	 of	 distinguishing	 the	 related	 acts	 of	 justice	 and	 legitimacy.	 While	 just	 can	 be	
understood	as	morally	informed	principles	through	which	decisions	are	appropriated	as	being	
correct,	 legitimacy	 denotes	 rules	 to	 which	 conformance	 is	 attained	 voluntarily	 without	
necessarily	believing	that	such	acts	are	just.	He	points	out	that	“the	concept	of	legitimacy	differs	
from	 the	 concept	 of	 justice	 insofar	 as	 citizens	 accept	 “just”	 principles	 as	 both	 morally	
appropriate	and	morally	correct,	whereas	citizens	accept	“legitimate”	uses	of	public	power	as	












authorities	 embarked	 on	 political	manoeuvres	 prior	 to	 independence	 such	 that	 	 some	 loyal	
Somalis	 were	 incorporated	 into	 the	 formal	 governing	 system	 primarily	 to	 bring	 about	 state	
legitimacy	 (Samatar,	 2009,	 Mohamed,	 2002b).	 These	 attempts	 did	 not,	 however,	 yield	
significant	improvements	in	the	relationship	between	the	colonial	state	and	Somalis.	As	a	result,	








Consequently,	 public	 perception	of	 state	 legitimacy	made	 little	 if	 any	progress.	 This	 became	
clear	 soon	 after	 independence	when	 poets	 who	were	 strong	 supporters	 of	 the	 struggle	 for	
independence	found	themselves	at	war	again	with	a	new	African	state	replicating	old	colonial	
behaviours.	Among	the	first	to	criticise	the	way	in	which	power-sharing	took	place	and	the	way	
in	 which	 resources	 were	misappropriated	 by	 the	 ruling	 elites	 was	 Ali	 Sugule	 (Sugule,	 1962,	
Sugule,	1966).	Growing	popular	discontent	with	the	immediate	postcolonial	state	facilitated	the	
coup	in	1969.	The	military	officers	who	overthrew	the	civilian	government	were	aware	of	the	




the	 aftermath	 of	 Somalia's	 war	 with	 Ethiopia	 in	 1997,	 public	 institutions	 were	 dilapidated	





eventual	 collapse	 of	 the	 state	 in	 Somalia	 [ibid].	 This	 insecurity	 and	 breakdown	 of	 state	 rule	
underpinned	 people’s	 tendency	 for	 concentrating	 in	 particular	 geographical	 locations.	 The	
manner	 in	which	 the	 state	was	 governed	 had	 significantly	 undermined	 trust	 in	 formal	 state	
institutions	 in	 the	 country.	 Trust	 in	 the	 state	 is	 particularly	 important	 in	 understanding	 the	
perpetuation	of	urban	segregation.	This	is	because	trust	plays	an	important	role	in	forming	social	
relationships	based	on	choice	and	reciprocity.	In	other	words,	the	state’s	mode	and	practices	of	
governance	 shapes	 the	 level	of	 credibility	and	 legitimacy	 it	 can	 reciprocally	 receive	 from	the	
public.			
Dunn	(1992,	p.	74)	defines	trust	as	the	“confident	expectation	of	benign	intentions	in	another	
free	 agent”.	 But	 Luhmann	 (1992)	 makes	 a	 distinction	 between	 confidence	 and	 trust.	While	
confidence	can	be	understood	as	a	certain	level	of	expectations	of	a	person	or	institutions,	trust	
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can	 be	 understood	 as	 being	 based	 on	 previous	 encounters	 and	 confidential	 information	
presupposing	 scenarios	 of	 risk.	 Similarly,	 Dasgupta	 (1992,	 p.	 51)	 places	 emphasis	 on	
expectations	by	defining	 trust	as	a	“sense	of	correct	expectations	about	 the	actions	of	other	









as	 social	 stigma	 or	 other	 forms	 of	 enforcement	 are	 applied.	 If	 trust	 in	 the	 enforcement	





in	 a	 relationship	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 prior	 knowledge	 [ibid].	 In	 other	 words,	 trust	 here	 can	 be	
understood	as	a	 commodity	held	by	 the	public	 and	 traded	 for	a	particular	outcome	of	 state	








Historically,	 colonial	 legacies	 and	 the	 manipulation	 of	 state	 instruments	 for	 the	 control	 of	
subjects	 can	be	considered	as	a	major	explanatory	 factor	 for	 the	 loss	of	public	 trust	 in	 state	
institutions	 (Mamdani,	 1996).	 Equally,	 postcolonial	 continuity	 of	 governance	 malpractices	
further	 undermined	 public	 expectations	 of	 independent	 African	 states,	 as	 they	 failed	 to	
constitute	 ruling	 arrangements	 different	 from	 those	 experienced	 during	 the	 colonial	 period	

















fragmentation,	by	which	 I	mean	the	same	as	segregation.	My	aim	below	 is	 first	 to	provide	a	
conceptual	 understanding	 of	 segregation.	 I	 then	 move	 onto	 discussing	 the	 causes	 and	




Urban	 segregation	 can	 be	 understood	 as	 a	 phenomenon	 where	 specifically	 defined	 groups	
occupy	particular	spaces	in	the	city,	voluntarily	or	involuntarily	maintaining	a	distance	from	one	
another	 for	 social,	economic	and	political	 reasons	 (Kaplan	and	Woodhouse,	2005,	Battersby,	





Dauskardt,	 1993).	 According	 to	 Massey	 and	 Denton	 (1988),	 urban	 segregation	 can	 be	
understood	as	the	outcome	of	social	and	economic	processes,	and	it	can	be	measured	within	a	
basic	 framework	consisting	of	at	 least	 five	main	components.	These	are	the	extent	to	which:	
groups	are	dispersed	across	spatial	units;	group	members	are	exposed	to	each	other	in	urban	
41	|	P a g e 	
	
	
spaces;	group	members	are	oriented	 towards	a	particular	 central	 residence;	particular	 social	







social	networks	with	neighbours.	 	The		 latter	 is	associated	with	negative	features	such	as	the	
exclusion	of	the	poor	from	opportunities	available	in	the	city	(Peach,	1996).	Van	Kempen	(1994)	
points	 to	 some	of	 the	main	weaknesses	 in	 these	dualistic	 framings,	 chief	among	 them	being	






can	 influence	 the	 outcome	 of	 efforts	 aimed	 at	 bringing	 about	 integrated	 spaces,	 as	 lack	 of	
understanding	of	the	relatively	wealthy	areas	can	 lead	to	misdiagnosis	and	 ineffectiveness	of	
city-wide	policy	efforts.		
Several	 distinct	 strands	 of	 academic	 writing	 can	 be	 distinguished	 on	 segregation.	 The	 first	
investigates	segregation	as	a	spatial	phenomenon	where	the	city	consists	of	different	segments	
occupied	 by	 various	 sections	 of	 the	 urban	 population	 (Balbo	 and	 Navez-Bouchanine,	 1995,	
Navez-Bouchanine,	 2003,	Navez-Bouchanine,	 2002	 cited	 in	Michelutti,	 undated).	 The	 second	




and	 services	 (Sassen,	 2002,	 Van	 Kempen,	 1994),	 while	 the	 fourth	 strand	 looks	 at	 political	
segregation	 where	 exclusion	 and	 inclusion	 are	 perpetuated	 through	 power	 relations	 and	
administrative	instruments	used	to	do	or	undo		policy	based	or	non-policy	based	institutional	
practices	(Navez-Bouchanine,	2002,	Pieterse,	2006,	Watson,	2009,	Parnell,	1991).	This	brings	us	
to	 the	 final	 thread	 of	 the	 debate,	 looking	 at	 urban	 segregation	 from	 social	 and	 cultural	







as	 well	 as	 the	 possible	 means	 through	 which	 its	 negative	 consequences	 can	 be	 mitigated	
(Michelutti,	undated).		
2.3.3 Causes	and	Impact	of	Segregation		
Segregation	 is	 generally	 cast	 as	 	 the	 result	 of	 two	 main	 processes:	 “social	 prejudice”	 and	






addition	 to	such	rationalisations	of	protection,	 segregation	 in	many	cities	during	 the	colonial	











and	 segmentation	 in	 colonial”	 urban	 form	 translated	 into	 a	 high	 level	 of	 inequality	 among	
																																								 																				
12	Regardless	of	how	segregation	 is	 justified,	 in	some	cases,	such	colonially	 induced	segregation	found	
currency	in	the	local	cultures.	For	instance,	in	some	Muslim	cities,	the	indigenous	communities	did	not	
mind	 segregation	 primarily	 because	 they	 wanted	 to	 protect	 their	 values	 from	 colonial	 influence	
(Muhammad,	et	al,	2015).	
	






Lewinson	 (2007)	 provides	 an	 example	 in	 which	 segregation	 came	 about	 as	 a	 result	 of	 class	
difference	in	an	East	African	context,	where	office	workers	socially	segregated	themselves	from	
those	 in	the	community	they	considered	as	backward.	Aside	from	class,	community	 interests	
can	 influence	 the	 emergence	 of	 voluntarily	 segregated	 residential	 patterns	 on	 the	 basis	 of	
‟strong	 taste	 for	 sharing	 a	 church	 or	 temple,	 preserving	 customs,	 trading	 with	 each	 other,	
borrowing	 from	 or	 lending	 to	 each	 other,	 speaking	 their	 language	 and	 teaching	 it	 to	 their	
children,	or	enjoying	each	other’s	company	in	day-to-day	affairs”	(Anas,	2006,	p.	542).		Spatial	
segregation	may	 also	 occur,	 either	 deliberately	 or	 inadvertently,	 on	 the	basis	 of	 land	use	or	
following	 infrastructural	 developments.	 An	 example	 of	 this	 is	 cities	 where	 primary	 and	
secondary	 use	 of	 land	 exhibits	 differentiation	 in	 the	 location	 of	 residential	 and	 commercial	
spaces	(K’Akumu	and	Olima,	2007).		
Elaborating	 the	 concept	 of	 ‘splintered	 urbanism’,	 Graham	 and	 Marvin	 (2001)	 posit	 that	
investment	 in	 infrastructural	 networks	 underpinned	 by	 differentiation	 in	 land	 use	 leads	 to	
segregation	 in	urban	spaces,	and	can	negatively	affect	 the	provision	of	services	across	cities.	
Their	 argument	 rests	 on	 four	 key	 points.	 Firstly,	 urban	 development	 tends	 to	 be	 advanced	
through	 the	 provision	 of	modern	 infrastructural	 networks	 across	 national	 economic	 spaces.	
Secondly	 the	 emergence	 of	 new	 information	 technologies	 has	 challenged	 the	 assumed	
inevitability	of	connections	through	physical	infrastructure,	as	these	new	technologies	have	to	
some	 extent	 ‛unbundled’	 infrastructural	 development,	 leading	 networks	 to	 be	 segmented.	
Thirdly,	 infrastructural	development	 strategies	 led	 to	 the	emergence	of	premium	networked	
spaces	where	wealthy	people	 live	 in	closed	off	 sections	of	 the	city	most	often	referred	to	as	
gated	communities.	Fourthly,	this	produces	resistance	in	the	form	of	social	movements	opposed	
to	the	inequalities	of	premium	spaces	and	commoditised	networks.		




global	 economic	 interaction	 and	 governance	 practices.	 Kooy	 and	 Bakker	 (2008)	 refute	 this	





One	 of	 the	most	 fundamental	 questions	 underpinning	 segregation	 discussions	 is	 that	which	
relates	to	its	impact.	This	is	important	because	segregation	is	not	only	produced	by	particular	
social,	 economic	 and	 political	 realities	 but	 it	 also	 produces	 particular	 social,	 economic	 and	
political	impacts	which	shape	experiences	of	urban	liveability.	These	include	both	negative	and	
perhaps	to	a	lesser	extent	positive	impacts.	Among	the	negative	impacts	of	segregation	include	






















may	 	 have	 contributed	 to	 political	 empowerment	 in	 some	 instances,	 as	 spatial	 separation	
formed	the	basis	on	which	particular	groups	fighting	for	greater	rights	are	incubated	in	areas	
predominantly	occupied	by	their	own	social	groups.	While	some	positive	 impacts	may	follow	



















was	 not	 necessarily	 inevitable	 as	 some	 of	 the	 Somali	 settlements	 prior	 to	 the	 arrival	 of	 the	
colonial	administration	had	signs	of	traversing	clan	and	lineage	boundaries.	I	also	argue	that	the	
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The	 urban	 significance	 of	 Hargeisa	 was	 boosted	 in	 1942/3	 when	 it	 became	 the	 seat	 of	 the	








of	 government,	 Hargeisa	 received	 greater	 infrastructural	 development	 in	 the	 run	 up	 to		
independence	(British	Somaliland	Protectorate,	1945).	These	new	projects	further	entrenched	









European	 population	 of	 the	 town	 was	 itself	 also	 divided	 along	 ethnic	 lines	 socially	 and	
economically.	While	Europeans	of	British	descent	mainly	occupied	prestigious	government	jobs,	
Italians	(many	of	whom	were	from	Italian	Somalia)	were	often	engaged	in	non-office	based	jobs	
such	 as	 mechanics	 and	 low-profile	 engineering	 occupations.	 The	 internal	 segregation	 of	















economic	situation	 in	Somaliland	after	 independence	has	also	 further	entrenched	the	spatial	
segregation	of	the	city.	Four	days	after	independence,	Somaliland	united	with	Somalia	and	this	
dawned	a	new	era	for	Hargeisa	as	meagre	state	resources	were	channelled	to	developing	the	
capital,	 Mogadishu,	 making	 it	 the	 prime	 city	 and	 central	 focus	 of	 action	 for	 all	 sorts	 of	
opportunities.	As	a	result,	the	handful	of	British-trained	skilled	men	and	to	lesser	extent	women	
from	Somaliland	 left	 for	 the	new	seat	of	government.	Equally,	businessmen	from	Somaliland	
increasingly	shifted	their	focus	to	the	South,	leaving	Hargeisa	for	those	unable	or	unwilling	to	
relocate	 for	whatever	 reason.	Soon	after	 independence,	 the	urban	elites	 from	the	North	 felt	





in	 the	 latter	 years	 of	 the	 British	 colonial	 power	was	 progressively	 becoming	 a	 capital	 in	 the	
making	 for	 a	 future	 Somaliland	 state.	 In	 the	 two	 decades	 after	 independence,	 however,	
unprecedented	 numbers	 of	 development	 projects	were	 implemented	 in	 the	 South.	 The	 first	
major	 resistance	 to	 this	marginalisation	 came	 in	1962	when	military	officers	 from	 the	North	
staged	 a	 coup	 in	 Hargeisa.18	 Although	 this	 failed,	 there	was	 a	 backlash	 in	 the	 form	 of	 state	




the	 social	 support	 system	 that	 the	 clan	 structure	 provides	 became	 an	 effective	 response	




returned	 from	 Sandhurst	Military	 College	 in	 the	UK	 led	 25	 junior	 officers	 to	 take	 over	major	military	
barracks	and	the	radio	in	Hargeisa.	
















of	 clan	politics	and	division	 in	 the	 system.	SNM,	which	capitalised	 significantly	on	defections	
from	the	regime,	strengthened	its	military	capability	as	a	guerrilla	movement	between	1981	and	
1988	when	 it	 launched	a	surprise	attack	on	government	bases	 in	major	urban	centres	 in	 the	
North.								
Hargeisa	 became	 the	 epicentre	 of	 the	 war	 Hargeisa	 and	 it	 was	 heavily	 bombarded	 by	 the	
government	 forces	 using	 both	 heavy	 artillery	 and	 air	 power	 (Gilkes,	 1989).	 Almost	 all	 the	
residents	 in	 the	city	 fled	to	the	neighbouring	countries,	as	well	as	 to	Asia,	Europe	and	North	
America	(Bradbury,	2008,	Hammond,	2014).	When	Mohamed	Sayyad	Barre	was	removed	from	
power	in	1991,	the	displaced	residents	returned,	reconstructing	what	was	left	of	their	homes.	








newcomers	 negotiated	 space	 and	 survival	 in	 areas	 populated	 by	 their	 clan.	 And	 thirdly,	 it	
contributed	 to	 the	construction	of	 the	city	by	 the	diaspora	who	remit	 substantial	amount	of	







trust,	and	urban	segregation,	 in	an	attempt	 to	understand	how	 identity-based	occupation	of	
particular	urban	spaces	can	to	some	degree	be	explained	by	governance	practices.	I	have	argued	
that	 there	 is	 a	need	 to	go	beyond	hybridity	 if	we	are	 to	understand	 the	 spatial	 character	of	
Hargeisa	 and	 the	 drivers	 and	 dynamics	 underpinning	 its	 segregation	 along	 clan	 lines.	While	
state-practices	are	 important	 in	 the	development	of	 segregation,	 I	 also	argued	 that	negative	
perceptions	of	state	legitimacy	and	the	erosion	of	public	trust	in	formal	institutions	can	become	
a	catalyst	which	drives	people	to	reside	in	areas	predominantly	occupied	by	people	with	whom	
they	share	 identity	and	relations	based	on	kinship.	 In	much	of	the	 literature	on	African	cities	
(outside	South	Africa),	and	particularly	in	understanding	of	Somali	cities,	authors	have	paid	little	
attention	 to	 identity-based	 segregation.	 This	 gap	 in	 scholarship	 is	 replicated	 in	 policy	 and	
practice.	 In	 contexts	 where	 efforts	 have	 been	made	 to	 dismantle	 geographical	 segregation,	
bridging	the	gap	in	spatial	inequality	often	became	a	monumental	task	with	few	tangible	results.	
The	 problem	 partly	 lies	 in	 misplaced	 priorities,	 as	 there	 has	 been	 a	 blatant	 failure	 of	 the	
intervening	authorities	to	transform	the	conditions	that	 initially	eroded	public	trust	 in	formal	
institutions.	 I	 have	 argued	 that	 policy	 efforts	 in	 the	 Somali	 context	 aimed	 at	 bringing	 about	
greater	 social	 cohesion	 above	 the	 clan	 identity,	 during	 both	 postcolonial	 and	 post-conflict	
periods,	 failed	 because	 of	 the	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 state	 behaved.	 For	 instance,	 the	 state	
breached	 water	 but	 drank	 wine	 during	 the	 postcolonial	 period,	 as	 it	 failed	 to	 live	 by	 the	
principles	it	rhetorically	advocated	i.e.	equitable	access	to	resources	and	services	regardless	of	
one’s	identity.	Similarly,	the	post-conflict	hybrid	order	has	become	bogged	down	in	governance	
malpractices	 (nepotism,	 corruption	 and	 cronyism)	 that	 undermined	 trust.	 The	 spatial	




















solely	 on	 urban	 dwellers’	 experience,	 but	 also	 to	 explore	 urban	 institutional	 dynamics	 and	
investigate	 the	 history	 of	 city	 governance,	 which	 is	 important	 in	 shaping	 urban	 residents’	
perceptions	and	actions.		The	data	for	this	study	was	gathered	over	a	period	of	nine	months.	




state	 and	 non-state	 actors	 in	Hargeisa.	 In	 the	 third	 and	 fourth	 sections,	 I	 discuss	my	 use	 of	
teashops	in	the	city	as	key	sites	of	data	gathering,	as	well	as	my	endeavours	of	tracing	former	
public	 officials	 in	 the	 diaspora.	 In	 the	 final	 section,	 I	 explore	 the	 limitations	 and	 ethical	
considerations	of	the	research.					
3.2 Brief	Overview	of	Data	Sources		
Primarily,	 this	 study	 relies	on	 three	main	 sets	of	data.	The	 first	 set	 consists	of	oral	histories,	
observations,	 interviews,	 informal	 conversations,	 and	 focus	 group	 discussions,	 which	 are	
conventional	to	urban	ethnographic	studies.	The	second	set	consists	of	newspapers,	blogs,	and	
websites.	The	final	set	consists	of	local	government	records,	court	records,	NGO	reports,	colonial	


















clan,	more	so	 since	 I	hail	 from	a	 local	 clan,	Habar	Yonis.	However,	 I	do	not	 see	clan	or	even	







all	 the	 rules	of	 fixed	 identity,	 taking	me	across	many	boundaries	 i.e.	my	 trajectory	has	been	
transurban,	transrural,	transnational,	and	transcivilisation.	In	a	nutshell,	my	life	experience	and	
sense	of	belonging	traverses	the	dominant	forms	of	belonging	such	as	clan,	tribe,	nation,	and	




ability	 of	 acquiring	 a	 set	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 skills	 as	 well	 as	 experiences	 that	 were	 not	


















experience	of	 issues	 related	 to	urban	 land	management	and	urban	 land	conflicts.	This	 set	of	
interviewees	 include	 land	owners	 or	 claimants	 as	well	 as	 relatives	 of	 those	 affected	by	 land	
conflicts	or	related	violence.	While	I	generally	tried	to	interview	as	diverse	a	range	of	people	as	
possible	 to	 gain	 different	 perspectives	 on	 urban	 matters,	 the	 voice	 of	 women	 is	 not	 well	
represented	in	this	research	due	to	inaccessibility	challenges.	Only	three	key	informants	and	a	
focus	 group	 discussion	 consisting	 of	 five	 women	 were	 interviewed	 for	 this	 research.	 To	
compensate	 for	 this	 underrepresentation,	 most	 court	 cases	 I	 selected	 for	 analysis	 involved	
women.		
The	 interviews	 and	 other	 research	 material	 were	 used	 variedly	 in	 the	 research.	 Some	 case	
studies	explored	in	greater	depth	relied	on	a	narrower	selection	of	interviews	while	others	had	
a	 larger	 range	of	 interviews	 and	other	 secondary	materials.	 	 For	 instance,	 the	 case	 study	 of	




LIST OF INTERVIEWEES 
KEY INFORMANTS PERSONAL INFORMANTS  
Politician (2) Land Owner - Taxi driver 
Policeman Land Owner - Farmer (2) 
Police Station Commander Land Owner – Agro-pastoralist (2) 
Hargeisa Local Government Councillor Hargeisa Resident - involved in land dispute (2) 
Opposition Member of Parliament Relatives of one of the attackers (3) 
Member of Parliament Relatives of one of the attackers (2) 
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Official - Ministry of Public Works Relatives of one of the attackers 
Official - Ministry of Aviation and Air Transport Land Broker (2) 
Ministry of Public Works Official (2) Farmer 
Ministry of Aviation – Official Famous Playwright 
Military Official Unemployed 
District Officer Student 
District Court Judge (2) SNM Fighter 
Director of Civil Unit - Legal Aid Clinic Lawyer - Farmer's Son (2) 
Director General of the Ministry of Public Works Lawyer - Farmer's Son 
Director General - Ministry of Aviation and Air 
Transport 
NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANISATIONS 
Director UNDP – JPLG Somali Official 
Civil Servant UNHABITAT – International Staff  
Chairman of Land Commission NGO Worker 
Former Minister of Interior. Activist for displaced people (2) 
Former Mayor of Hargeisa (2) Activist and Social Researcher. 
Solicitor General of Somaliland IT Specialist in an NGO 
Prosecutor Religious Leader 
Criminal Lawyer TRADITIONAL LEADERS 
Legal Advisor for Electoral Commission Sultan (2) 
Lawyer (2) Elder (2) 
Oral Historian, Artist and Radio Presenter. Clan Elder 
Local Resident Involved in Land Dispute Son of a Chief Akil and Lecturer at the University of Hargeisa 
Academic INFORMANTS IN THE DIASPORA  
Retired Agricultural Economist Former Governor of North Western Province. 
 Former District Commissioner of Hargeisa 
 Former Chairman of Somaliland Atrocities Commission. 
 Seaman21 from Hargeisa 
	
The	 above-mentioned	 interviews	were	 complemented	by	 four	 focus	 group	discussions.	 Each	
focus	group	consisted	of	at	least	of	6	individuals	from	a	diverse	range	of	backgrounds,	selected	
for	their	shared	experience	and	interest	in	a	particular	theme	(Tracey	and	Burgess,	2001).	Like	
the	 interviews,	 I	 selected	 the	 focus	 group	
participants	 from	varying	 social	 and	 interest	
groups	 such	 as	 the	 youth,	 business	 people,	
women’s	 groups,	 members	 of	 the	 religious	





LIST OF FOCUS GROUPS 
Traditional Leaders Focus Group (8 Participants) 
Religious Leaders Focus Group (5 Participants) 
Women’s Focus Group Discussion (5 Participants)  
Preliminary Focus Group on Land Conflict (7 Participants) 
Table	3:	The	list	of	focus	groups	








roundabout	 in	 from	 of	 Bar	 Hargeisa	 and	 a	 hand	 holding	 the	map	 of	 Somaliland	 in	 Kaalinta	
Sideedaad:	all	of	which	signify	conflict	and	or	immediate	post-conflict	Isaaq	centred	historical	
references.	 This	makes	 the	 city	 identity	 Isaaq	 centred	 and	 it	 has	 to	 some	 extent	 influenced	
availability	and	access	to	information.		
Among	 the	 social	 groups	 included	 in	 the	 study	were	 also	 returnees	 from	 the	 diaspora.	 The	
intention	 was	 to	 be	 inclusive.	 As	 focus	 groups	 tend	 to	 either	 become	 consensual	 where	
participants	mostly	agree	on	the	discussed	issues	or	dissentient	where	they	disagree	significantly	
(Tracey	and	Burgess,	2001),	 I	employed	careful	moderation	 so	as	 to	ensure	 that	 issues	were	
debated	by	their	merit.	The	first	focus	group	took	place	in	the	early	stage	of	my	fieldwork,	with	
the	aim	of	getting	a	general	picture	of	key	issues	and	the	current	and	historical	trends	of	urban	








of	 interviewing	women.	On	 the	 one	hand,	 I	 feared	 that	when	 interviewing	women	with	 the	






Given	 the	 unequal	 power	 relations	 between	 men	 and	 women	 in	 Somali	 settings,	 careful	
selection	of	venues	was	crucial	for	women	interviewees.	I	tried	not	to	make	assumptions	and	
sought	 to	mitigate	 these	power	 relations	by	 attempting	 to	hold	 interviews	 in	 a	woman-only	






rooms,	 and	 a	 notary	 firm	 in	 the	 city	 centre.	 They	 unanimously	 chose	 the	 latter	 for	 its	













the	OCVP	 financial	 infrastructure	 to	 issue	 receipts	 to	ensure	 transparency	and	accountability	
(and	I	then	reimbursed	the	OCVP).					
In	 addition	 to	 the	 focus	 groups	 and	 interviews,	media	 sources	 also	 proved	 to	 be	 important	




necessarily	 directly	 connected	 but	 relevant	 to	 my	 study.	 Among	 the	 websites	 I	 monitored	
included	 salaanmedia.com,	 qarrannews.com,	 hadhwnaagnews.com,	 somaliland.org,	




In	 addition,	 I	 monitored	 the	 social,	 political	 and	 economic	 climate	 in	 the	 city	 through	
participating	 in	 discussions	 in	 teashops,	 which	 are	 important	 public	 places	 where	 people	




discussion	are	often	 termed,	 in	 the	Somali	 language,	 fadhi	ku	dirir.	This	 loosely	 translates	 to	
engaging	 in	 conflict	 while	 sitting.	 In	 other	 words,	 it	 is	 a	 form	 of	 public	 discourse	 in	 which	
participants	intimately	(or	seemingly	so)	debate	about	topics	ranging	from	social	and	religious	
issues	 to	 economic	 and	 political	 issues.	 	 Such	 debates	 provided	 particularly	 a	 significant	
opportunity	for	gaining	urban	ethnographic	data.		
The	above-mentioned	interviews,	focus	groups,	teashop	discussions,	and	media	sources	were	
supplemented	with	 reports	and	other	 recent	post-conflict	archival	materials	 collected	 locally	








will	 outline	 the	 key	 dynamics	 and	 contours	 of	 assembling	 data	 from	 the	 above-mentioned	
sources.	
3.3 Institutional	Affiliation	and	Accessibility	of	Informants	
My	fieldwork	began	in	 late	February	2014,	when	I	arrived	in	Hargeisa	from	London.	 	 It	was	a	
familiar	environment	both	at	the	personal	and	professional	level.	At	the	personal	level,	I	grew	
up	in	this	city,	having	as	a	result	both	family	and	friend	networks,	while	at	the	professional	level,	
I	 worked	 with	 the	 Observatory	 of	 Conflict	 and	 Violence	 Prevention	 (OCVP).	 The	 PhD	was	 a	
collaborative	doctoral	 study	co-sponsored	by	 the	OCVP	and	 the	University	of	Sussex.	On	 the	
OCVP	 side,	 the	 funding	 was	 a	 small	 part	 of	 £1.8	 million	 grant	 from	 the	 United	 Kingdom’s	











organisation	 could	 support	me	 in	my	 study.	My	 second	meeting	was	with	 the	 Logistical	 and	
Human	Resources	manager,	Safia	Ahmed.	We	discussed	ways	in	which	I	could	share	access	to	







One	 problem	 I	 encountered	 in	 fulfilling	 this	 requirement	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 in	 many	 cases	
appointments	were	made	on	ad	hoc	basis	often	requiring	me	to	be	flexible	and	meet	informants	
at	a	time	and	place	of	their	choice,	mostly	with	very	short	notice.	This	was	made	all	the	more	
difficult	 by	 the	 fact	 that	meetings	 were	 constantly	 cancelled	 or	 delayed	 by	 the	 informants,	
particularly	 key	 informants	working	 for	 the	government.	 Furthermore,	 the	absence	of	public	
transport	that	could	complement	my	access	to	the	OCVP	transportation	was	also	a	hindrance.	
In	order	to	overcome	these	problems,	there	were	two	choices.	Rent	or	buy	a	car.	I	opted	for	the	
latter	 and	 bought	 a	 second	 hand	 car	 at	 the	 cost	 of	 $2100,	 payable	 in	 instalments.	 This	was	
moderately	 cheaper	 than	 renting	 car	 at	 a	 cost	 of	 $600	 per	 month.	 Being	 from	 the	 local	
community,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 mention	 that	 my	 experience	 with	 logistical	 issues	 and	 their	
interface	 with	 safety	 and	 security	 was	 relatively	 cheaper	 than	 that	 of	 foreign	 researchers	
negotiating	 data	 collection	 in	 Somaliland.	 The	 latter	 are	 required	 to	 hire	 armed	 escort	 from	





Chief	 among	 the	 state	 actors	 were	 officials	 in	 local	 government,	 the	 statutory	 courts,	 the	
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informal	 Islamic	courts.	They	also	 included	non-governmental	organisations	both	at	 the	 local	
and	 international	 level.	 At	 the	 international	 level,	 I	 was	 interested	 in	 the	 United	 Nations	




which	has	 in	 the	past	done	 significant	 research	on	 land	 conflicts;	 and	 the	 Social	 Research	&	
Development	Institute	(SORADI),	which	also	has	a	history	in	research	on	local	governance	and	





















the	names	and	contact	details	of	 those	 I	 thought	 to	be	potential	key	 informants.	However,	 I	
went	through	the	same	experience,	as	I	was	unable	to	locate	them,	except	the	Minister	whom	I	
found	to	be	not	only	punctual	but	also	engaging.	These	hiccups	convinced	me	that	I	needed	to	
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change	 tactics.	 I	 imagined	 that	 social	 networking	 and	more	 informal	 ethnographic	methods	
would	be	more	effective	in	locating	key	public	officials	than	formally	approaching	them	in	their	






in	 itself	 was	 important	 to	 understand	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 insight	 to	 how	 recent	 urban	 politics,	
governance	and	planning	in	Hargeisa	works,	and	its	impact	on	urban-dwellers’	lives.	In	addition,	
local	 government	 offices	 were	 important	 as	 they	 housed	 the	 Land	 Tribunal	 –	 or	 Land	




and	 granting	me	 an	 interview,	 he	was	 also	 crucial	 in	 facilitating	 further	 contacts	within	 the	





meeting	 occurred	 in	 a	 city	 centre	 restaurant,	 Hadhwanaag,	 where	 we	 had	 informal	

































even	non-sensitive)	data	which	could	affect	 their	 relationship	with	 the	government.	Another	
reason	why	access	to	international	NGOs	might	have	been	difficult	is	the	fact	that	there	was	a	
sense	of	 competition	between	 researchers	 coming	 from	outside	and	 the	 international	NGOs	






fact	 that	 I	 was	 introduced	 to	 the	 scholars	 operating	 the	 Islamic	 court	 by	 individuals	 they	
respected	 and	 knew.	 I	 tried	 to	 compensate	 for	 this	 up-tightness	 through	 contacts	 who	 had	
insight	into	how	Islamic	courts	operate	and	interact	with	people	involved	in	land	conflicts.	As	
evident	here,	 individuals	who	come	 from	Western	countries,	 regardless	of	whether	 they	are	
Somalis	or	not,	are	often	viewed	with	suspicious	eyes.	More	serious	worries	 included	that	of	




I	 was	 made	 aware	 that	 social	 science	 research	 in	 Somali	 settings	 is	 negatively	 affected	 by	
conspiracy	theories	used	by	different	social	forces	to	discredit	researchers.	The	foundation	of	
such	 suspicions	 is	 not	 only	 related	 to	 recent	 world	 politics	 but	 is	 also	 rooted	 historically	 in	
footprints	 left	 behind	 by	 explorers	 who	 disguised	 themselves	 as	 Muslims	 in	 order	 to	 gain	
information	 about	 Somali	 territories.	 For	 instance,	 Richard	 Burton,	 a	 British	 explorer,	 who	









traditional	 leaders	 to	 provide	 information).	 In	 order	 to	 avoid	 bias	 primarily	 induced	by	 their	
familiarity	with	 the	 line	of	work	 the	OCVP	 is	 involved	 in,	 I	 sought	access	 to	other	 traditional	






cases	 it	 handles.	 Key	 to	 my	 endeavours	 for	 accessing	 particular	 	 communities	 was	 the	
establishment	 of	 trust	 (Tonkin,	 1984).	 For	Hyndman	 (2001)	 creating	 trust	 could	 involve	 	 the	
ethnographer	immersing	him/herself	in	the	reality	s/he	is	studying.	The	researcher	in	this	sense	
becomes	part	of	the	reality	and	hence	gets	more	insight,	help	and	cooperation	in	the	process	of	










Institute,	who	was	recently	appointed	for	Chief	 Justice,	 informed	me	about	an	opening	 for	a	
part-time	position	for	teaching	research	methods	to	postgraduate	students.	I	taught	this	course	
along	with	another	colleague	from	University	of	Addis	Ababa,	spending	about	6	hours	a	week	
over	 a	 period	 of	 one	 month.	 Most	 of	 those	 enrolled	 in	 the	 course	 were	 working	 with	 the	




my	 ability	 to	 gather	 data	 from	 different	 geographical	 areas.	 The	 process	 of	 making	 new	










issues	 that	 surfaced	became	 too	wide	 for	my	 focus	on	understanding	 the	 interface	between	








23	 Nonetheless,	 the	 author	 notes	 that	 familiarity	with	 context	 is	 not	 a	 guarantee	 for	 easier	 access	 to	
information.	Even	if	one	is	familiar	with	the	research	site,	there	is	a	need	to	re-establish	contacts	as	some	
people	may	have	changed	their	contact	details	s	or	left	the	region/county.	See	(Gokah,	2006).	























mind,	 I	 experimented	with	 these	 sites,	 and	my	 first	 teashop	discussion	was	with	 a	 group	of	









distance	 to	 the	 various	 neighbourhoods.	 	 Secondly,	 it	was	 cheaper	 than	most	 of	 the	 formal	
teashops	–	it	was	located	in	public	open	space	in	front	of	a	former	commercial	bank	and	so	the	








by	 small-scale	 traders	and	did	not	have	names.	 	 I	 also	held	appointments	and	discussions	 in	
hotels	and	restaurants	such	as	the	Shiraaqle,	Star,	Maansoor	and	Ambassador.		
More	 often	 than	 not,	 people	 who	 knew	 my	 contacts	 also	 joined	 us	 and	 provided	 crucial	
information	and	 insight	 into	 the	problem	of	urban	 land	markets,	management	and	conflicts.	
Discussions	of	this	nature	took	more	time	than	normal	interviews.	But	the	longer	I	sat	in	a	tea	
shop	with	people	I	knew,	the	more	likely	that	other	people	I	do	not	know	joined	us	and	provided	











Some	 of	 the	 key	 individuals	 who	 were	 useful	 for	 shedding	 light	 on	 the	 history	 of	 urban	






24	 Research	 in	 Somali	 setting	 is	more	productive	when	 tape	 recording	 is	 not	 involved.	 See	 (Balthasar,	
2012).	
25	Who	himself	was	a	former	police	official	in	the	final	years	of	the	military	regime.	









where	we	 discussed	 urban	 governance	 during	 his	 time,	 particularly	 urban	 land	 and	 security	
management.				





Library	 was	my	 primary	 base	 for	 reading	 and	writing,	 I	 also	 spent	 two	weeks	 in	 the	 British	













this	 study,	 the	 integrity	 and	 quality	 of	 the	 research	 were	 safeguarded	 throughout	 the	 data	
collection	and	analytical	processes.	I	made	an	explicit	effort	in	collecting	and	analysing	data	to	
capture	different	perspectives.		





and	national	 and	ethnic	 affiliation	 as	 a	way	 to	obtain	 information,	which	 could	have	proved	
difficult	 to	obtain	otherwise.	As	 I	 have	 already	elaborated,	 social	 networks	were	particularly	







it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 this	 has	 changed	 significantly	 over	 the	 last	 few	 decades	 where	


















her	 fieldwork,	 the	 colleagues	 at	 the	UN	office	where	 she	was	 volunteering	 suggested	 introduction	 to	
Canadian	colleagues	at	the	UN.	She	sees	the	reason	for	which	this	introduction	was	made	was	essentially	
to	 enable	 her	 get	 access	 to	 better	 facilitation	 and	 help	 for	 her	 research	 through	 her	 nationality	
background.	





with	 traces	 of	 participants.	 This	was	 particularly	 important	 because	 the	 study	 encompassed	





researcher,	 I	was	 fully	aware	of	 this	and	respected	people’s	choice,	as	silence	can	serve	as	a	
coping	strategy	in	post-conflict	context	(Goodhand,	2000).	
As	independence	and	impartiality	are	crucial	for	any	credible	study,	I	made	an	uttermost	effort	
to	 remain	 impartial.	Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 important	 to	point	out	 that	 regardless	of	my	effort	 in	
ensuring	impartiality,	I	am	aware	that	I	may	be	accused	of	partiality.	This	is	because	Hargeisa	is	
a	contested	urban	space	where	clan	politics	prevail.	Hassan	(2015)	points	out	that	one	rarely	
conducts	 research	 in	settings	where	 the	 informant	 is	also	 insider	without	making	a	balanced	
compromise	between	responsibility	and	 trust.	 In	 such	a	setting	one	might	be	seen	as	biased	
towards	his	clan	and	hence	this	may	negatively	affect	one’s	image	in	certain	quarters.	Having	





that	 these	 are	 unavailable	 for	 public	 consumption.	 As	 other	 researchers	 in	 Hargeisa	 have	
experienced	 (See	Omar	 and	Osman,	 2016),	 further	 problems	on	 visualisation	 also	 related	 to	
photos.	 In	other	words,	 taking	photos	 in	Hargeisa	 is	not	welcome,	as	many	people	prefer	 to	
remain	anonymous	both	in	text	and	image.		
3.8 Conclusion		








trace	 key	 public	 officials	 in	 the	 diaspora.	 Finally,	 the	 chapter	 discussed	 ethical	 issues	 and	
considerations	 for	 the	 study.	Having	 familiarised	 the	 reader	with	 the	methodology,	 the	next	
chapters	deploy	my	empirical	data	to	show	how	urban	governance	shapes	Hargeisa	spatial	form.		
The	following	chapter	begins	by	discussing	findings	on	governance	at	the	municipal	 level	and	
subsequent	 chapters	 zoom	 into	 narrower	 aspects	 such	 as	 land	 administration,	 conflict	 and	
adjudication.			
	 	






history	 of	 urban	 institutions,	 drawing	 on	 oral	 narratives,	 archives	 and	 ethnographic	 field	
research.	 This	 historical	 approach	 is	 important	 because	 history	 in	 Somaliland	 is	 a	 lived	
experience	 where	 particular	 episodes	 are	 often	 used	 as	 a	 point	 of	 reference	 positively	 or	
negatively	for	the	legitimation	of	power	and	authority.	For	instance,	memories	of	how	things	
were	done	 in	the	past	serve	 in	many	cases	as	examples	of	how	a	state	should	behave	 in	the	
present	 or	 the	 future.	 This	 chapter	 will	 explore	 continuities	 and	 changes	 in	 the	 interaction	
between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 intermediary	 customary	 institutions	 through	 which	











which	undermined	the	powers	of	Akils.	 I	 show	that	popular	resistance	to	the	 introduction	of	
local	 governance	 contributed	 to	 the	 growing	 sense	 of	 nationalism	 and	 therefore	 had	 the	





to	 employment	 and	 other	 economic	 opportunities	 did	 not	 emasculate	 the	 resort	 to	 clan	 in	
practice.	 Furthermore,	 I	 argue	 that	 state	 led	 developments	 and	 re-planning	 of	 cities	 –	 i.e.	
through	 self-help	 campaigns	 and	 evictions	 –	 re-segregated	 the	 city,	while	 also	 resulting	 in	 a	
cosmopolitan	 moment	 of	 cross-clan	 opposition	 to	 the	 government.	 I	 also	 discuss	 the	 post-










Protectorate’s	 survival	 on	 meagre	 resources	 was	 largely	 attributable	 to	 colonial	 officers’	
effectiveness,	I	argue	a	large	part	of	such	survival	can	be	attributed	to	the	role	Akils	played	in	
the	 administration	 of	 the	 population.	 But,	 as	 independence	 approached,	 the	 colonial	
government	made	concerted	efforts	aimed	at	reorganising	power	as	its	policies	shifted	towards	
the	 creation	 of	 what	 can	 essentially	 be	 understood	 as	 responsible	 governance	 as	 part	 of	
preparation	for	independence.	In	theory,	these	policies	were	meant	to	formalise	power	of	the	
Akils	by	setting	up	urban	councils,	designed	to	foster	conditions	conducive	for	a	transition	to	
civic	 rule	 based	 on	 citizenship	 rather	 than	 subjecthood.	 I	 argue	 that	 opposition	 to	 local	
governance	can	be	interpreted	as	an	attempt	by	Hargeisa	residents	to	reject	the	reorganisation	
of	power	over	space,	providing	them	with	common	cause	traversing	clan	interests	around	which	
they	 could	 unite	 and	 temporarily	 reducing	 segregation.	While	 colonial	 authorities	 were	 not	
intent	on	promoting	national	citizenship	in	place	of	subjecthood	before	independence,	they	also	
wanted	to	begin	a	process	of	transition	away	from	Akils’	prior	powers.	In	short,	the	introduction	
and	 resistance	 to	 local	 governance	 impacted	on	how	people	 related	 to	each	other,	with	 the	
effect	of	mitigating	prior	urban	political	segregation.		




the	 shape	 of	 the	 new	 structures	 and	 the	 role	 of	 customary	 institutions.	 This	 marked	 the	
beginning	of	efforts	aimed	at	devolving	power	in	a	limited	sense	to	local	government	structures	
as	part	of	a	larger	policy	of	Somalising	the	administration	for	eventual	independence.	The	key	
questions	were;	 could	 the	 Somali	 people	 practice	 a	Western	model	 of	 democracy	 and	 elect	
councils	on	the	basis	of	universal	suffrage	or	would	it	be	more	practical	and	cheaper	to	use	the	
existing	 political	 institutions	 to	 introduce	 municipal	 governance?	 Locally	 based	 colonial	
















Vertically,	above	 this	 level	of	public	authority	was	 the	equally	 important	sub	clan	shir	where	
elders	 of	 the	 different	 groups	 congregate	 and	 deliberate	 on	 collectively	 binding	 decisions.	
Correspondence	between	London	and	the	colonial	administrators	in	Hargeisa	show	that	there	
was	a	consensus	about	the	absence	of	effective	public	authorities	suitable	for	local	governance	
introduction	 above	 this	 level	 of	 Somali	 traditional	 decision-making	 platforms,	 except	 when	
greater	clan	groupings	were	needed	for	warfare	or	defence	purposes.	28		
Prior	to	the	Somali	participation	in	formal	urban	governance	in	the	form	of	town	councils	and	



















having	 affinities	 along	 geographical’	 lines.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 constituted	 authorities	would	
consist	 of	 tribal	 leaders	 paid	 by	 the	 government	 and	 assisted	 by	 councillors	 who	 would	
voluntarily	work	for	the	local	government.		
The	next	step	was	the	“setting	up	of	district	councils	composed	of	representatives	of	all	classes,	
including	 the	 local	 authorities,	 [and]	 they	would	 be	 advised	 at	 first	 but	might	 become	 local	
government	 bodies	 later”.31	 Though	 the	 plan	was	 seen	 as	 progress	 by	 locally	 based	 colonial	
administrators,	 London	 was	 concerned	 about	 the	 viability	 and	 sustainability	 of	 such	 local	







of	London,	 local	colonial	administrators	were	more	optimistic	about	the	 introduction	of	 local	
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Being	 the	 biggest	 towns	 in	 the	 protectorate,	 Hargeisa	 and	 Berbera	 hosted	 the	 first	 Town	
Councils,	established	in	1953.35	In	the	case	of	Hargeisa,	the	nominated	members	of	the	Council	
formed	the	majority	of	the	assembly	and	they	had	limited	‘legal	and	financial	autonomy’.36	The	
District	 Commissioner	 was	 the	 ultimate	 authority	 in	 the	 council	 and	 was	 empowered	 to	
manipulate	 rules	 	 leaving	 no	 room	 for	 deviation	 from	 the	 established	 norm	 of	 colonial	
administration	in	the	Protectorate.	Another	opportunity	for	avoiding	any	significant	devolution	
of	 power	 was	 presented	 by	 the	 scarcity	 of	 skilled	 staff,	 which	made	 the	 staffing	 of	 council	
dependent	 on	 the	 central	 state.37	 	 In	 other	 words,	 civil	 servants	 working	 for	 the	 central	
government	were	transferred	to		local	government	so	as	to	help	these	experimental	structures	
perform	their	duties.		
While	 the	 colonial	 government	 saw	 the	 introduction	 of	 local	 governance	 as	 a	 positive	 step	
towards	the	Somalisation	of	 the	administration,	 the	 local	population	was	sceptical	about	the	
aims	 and	 objectives	 of	 the	 exercise.	 The	 locally-based	 colonial	 administrators	 related	 this	
scepticism	to	temporal	and	aptitude	factors	noting	that:		
this	prompts	the	enquiry	whether	the	Somalis	are	sufficiently	developed	to	








75	|	P a g e 	
	
	
whether]	 it	 may	 well	 be	 that	 given	 definitive	 powers	 with	 something	
concrete,	reluctance	to	accept	responsibility	will	gradually	disappear.38	






the	 native	 security	 apparatus,	 messengers,	 translators	 or	 small	 scale	 businessmen	 who	


















three	 categories	 of	 opposition	 to	 the	 government	 plan:	 nationalists	 who	 claimed	 to	 be	 the	









represented	 the	 most	 forceful	 threat	 because	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 their	 influence	 was	 growing	
exponentially.	Non-violent	nationalist	movements	in	the	Protectorate	were	drawing	inspiration	








district	 officers,	 Akils,	 Jawabdars	 [interpreters]	 and	 recognised	 religious	
leaders.40			
Drawing	inspiration	from	instances	of	civil	disobedience,	supporters	of	nationalist	movements	
such	 as	 the	 Somali	 National	 League	 (SNL)	 and	 Somali	 Youth	 League	 (SYL)41	 	 showed	 strong	
resistance	to	the	introduction	of	local	government.42	The	torchbearers	of	this	opposition	were	
mainly	urbanites	who	were	considered	by	the	colonial	government	as	“detribalised	and	semi-
detribalised	 progressives	 [with]	 a	 disruptive	 influence”	 in	 Hargeisa.43	 For	 these	 nationalist	





















but	 it	 is	 difficult	 to	 become	 a	 son	 of	 the	 city.	 If	 you	 pose	 a	 question	 to	








undermines	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 united	 political	 vision	 based	 on	
farsightedness	where	people	have	identity	other	than	the	clan.	For	instance,	
in	 urban	 contexts	 it	 was	 usual	 to	 hear	 that	 somebody	 is	 from	 Hargeisa,	
Berbera	 or	 Mogadishu.	 The	 interaction	 between	 the	 two	 groups	 also	
significantly	differ.45		
In	a	bid	to	counter	the	opposition	to	local	governance	and	customary	institutions,	the	colonial	
administration	saw	 it	necessary	 to	create	a	more	British	 friendly	environment	 in	Hargeisa	by	
reinvigorating	broadcasting	facilities.46	Colonial	records	show	that	part	of	the	intention	of	this	




46	Radio	broadcast	was	 first	aired	 in	Hargeisa	 in	1941.	The	broadcasts	were	used	as	an	administrative	









inform	 people	 about	 the	 intention	 behind	 the	 introduction	 of	 local	 government	 as		
‘development	machinery	whereby	the	people	can	combine	to	improve	their	own	conditions	by	
their	own	efforts	with	government	guidance	on	education	and	health	services	as	well	as	water	
supplies’.47	As	such	 information	alone	may	have	been	 insufficient	 to	convince	Somalis	of	 the	
purpose	of	the	local	government,	the	administrators	suggested	that	‘leading	Somalis	should	be	
taken	to	some	suitable	parts	of	the	Sudan	to	see	for	themselves	what	has	been	achieved	there’.48	
The	 radio	 broadcast	 was,	 however,	 a	 double-edged	 knife.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 it	 enabled	 the	
colonial	administrators	to	advance	support	for	the	introduction	of	local	governance	and	social	
development	 agendas,	 particularly	 education,	 to	 which	 the	 population	 was	 hostile	 in	 the	
beginning.	But	on	the	other	hand,	those	entrusted	with	advancing	these	 initiatives	were	also	
furthering	 nationalist	 ideas	 through	 songs	 and	 poetry	which	were	 full	 of	 idioms	 and	 riddles	








and	 worked	 with	 this	 produced	 the	 greatest	 stability	 of	 rule”.	 As	 evident	 here,	 to	 borrow	
Frederiksen’s	 framing,	 the	 colonial	 administration	 was	 caught	 between	 a	 need	 to	 maintain	
political	order	and	desire	to	bring	about	British-friendly	social	transformation.	In	other	words,	
local	 government	 was	 used	 as	 a	 way	 of	 bringing	 about	 reorganising	 power	 over	 space	 –	


















trust	 in	 the	state.	 I	 show	that	power	 remained	centralised	and	concentrated	 in	 the	hands	of	
public	officials	such	as	DCs	and	PCs	who	acted	and	behaved	like	the	colonial	masters.	In	other	
words,	 the	political	authorities	 failed	 to	create	a	governance	environment	based	on	national	
citizenship	rather	the	clan-based	and	highly	mediated	statehood	where	customary	institutions	
acted	and	were	used	as	gatekeepers	for	access	to	services.		
Postcolonial	urban	governance	 in	 the	Somali	 republic	was	 characterised	by	 continuity	 rather	
than	change	of	colonial	administrative	practices.	Notwithstanding	the	fact	that	the	mantra	of	








limited	 to	 the	management	of	 the	Zaribas	 (a	 local	urban	market),	maintenance	of	 roads	and	
garbage	collection.	As	such,	it	failed	to	attract	either	capable	politicians	or	skilled	labour	force	
as	most	 of	 those	 qualified	 enough	 for	 running	 a	 city	 had	 taken	 up	 vacancies	 at	 the	 central	
government	 level.	 The	 District	 Commissioners	 and	 Regional	 Governors	 in	 collaboration	with	
intermediary	institutions	ran	the	show.	According	to	Ray	(1996)	one	of	the	reasons	that		chiefs	




traditional	 authorities	 coexist	 in	 the	 postcolonial	 context.	 This	 coexistence	 was	 however	
characterised	by	 tensions.	 In	 the	 case	of	 the	Somali	Republic,	 these	 tensions	were	managed	
80	|	P a g e 	
	
	
differently	 by	 the	 civilian	 and	 military	 postcolonial	 regimes.	 During	 the	 civilian	 government	
(1960	 to	 1969),	 Akils50	 assumed	 greater	 role	 in	 the	 mediation	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	 people	





The	spatial	manifestation	of	 the	role	of	Akils	 in	politics	 is	 important	 for	understanding	urban	








for	 bureaucratic	 development,	 they	 were	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 seen	 as	 an	 effective	 way	 of	
controlling	 the	vast	unmanned	 territories	of	 this	young	nation.	As	 sovereignty	and	 territorial	
control	that	comes	with	it	depend	on	the	availability	of	certain	levels	of	resources	(Pesek,	2011),	








50	 Akils’	 relationship	 with	 the	 state	 was	 determined	 initially	 through	 their	 roles	 in	 the	 struggle	 for	
independence.	Those	individuals	who	were	on	the	side	of	the	colonial	rulers	were	side-lined	by	the	new	
state	 while	 those	 who	 were	 involved	 in	 the	 struggles	 enjoyed	 better	 status	 and	 access	 to	 the	 state	









The	 DC	 says	 that	 when	 he	 was	 transferred	 to	 Hargeisa,	 there	 were	 51	 cases	 of	 unresolved	














his	 clan	was	 responsible	 for	 the	 death	 of	 the	 five	men	 in	 retaliation	 for	 a	
religious	man	killed	by	the	other	clan.	Another	young	man	from	the	other	clan	
also	stood	up	and	said	that	the	religious	man	was	killed	by	his	clan	and	that	




















































The	 clan	 conflicts	 and	 insecurity	 seem	 likely	 to	 have	 undone	 some	 of	 the	 prior	 impetus	 to	
cosmopolitan	choice	of	 residence	 in	urban	contexts,	promoting	a	 recourse	 to	segregation.	 In	
other	words,	security	concerns	and	fear	of	revenge	attacks	by	other	clans	as	well	as	the	fact	that	
the	 state	 was	 unable	 to	 guarantee	 safety	 in	 Hargeisa	 made	 it	 difficult	 for	 people	 to	 trust	
neighbourhoods	unpopulated	by	their	clans,	perpetuating	segregation	along	clan	lines.	
4.4 Breaking	with	the	Past?	Military	Rule	
The	 civilian	 era	 thus	 did	 not	 usher	 in	 change	 regarding	 the	 importance	 of	 clan	 and	 the	 first	
notable	break	with	the	past	came	in	1969	when	the	military	took	over.	Of	particular	importance	
in	terms	of	breaking	with	the	past	was	a	set	of	policies	aimed	at	promoting	national	citizenship	




was	 further	 weakened.	 Councillors	 were	 dismissed	 and	 the	 role	 of	 municipality	 in	 city	




in	 most	 of	 the	 neighbourhoods	 where	 people	 were	 called	 in	 on	 weekly	 basis	 to	 hear	 long	





criminalising	 clan	 identity.	 In	 1971,	 the	 state	declared	 clannism,	 “which	was	 associated	with	
nepotism	 and	 corruption,	 officially	 banned	 and	 ritually	 buried”	 (Lewis,	 1989,	 p.	 573)	 in	
																																								 																				
56	Interviewee	7	August	20,	2014	Oral	Historian,	Artist	and	Radio	Presenter.	
84	|	P a g e 	
	
	















Hargeisa	 was	 given	 unparalleled	 attention	 by	 the	 security	 forces	 and	 most	 importantly	 by	
guulwadeyaal.	As	 repression	 and	 forced	 compliance	with	 government	directives	became	 the	
norm	rather	than	exception	 in	Hargeisa,	everyone	started	fearing	for	their	 lives	 including	the	
‘hard	headed	nomads’	in	colonial	terms.	This	unprecedented	level	of	fear	led	to	a	reduction	in	






consisting	 of	 senior	 government	 officials,	 businessmen	 and	wealthy	 people	 from	 the	 Somali	
Diaspora	–	such	as	the	Red	Sea	neighbourhood	formed	in	the	West	of	the	town.59		As	evident	





















a	 specific	 geographical	 area	 –	 a	 town	 neighbourhood	 for	 example	 (or	 a	 village	 in	 rural	
contexts).60	 The	 new	 arrangements	 thus	 spatialised	 and	 territorialised	 the	 operation	 of	 the	
institution	in	such	a	way	that	the	authority	of	the	Akil	was	no	longer	necessarily	confined	to	the	
clan	he	comes	from.		
I	argue	 that	 this	move	can	be	seen	essentially	as	a	way	of	undermining	Akils’	 legitimacy	and	
jurisdiction,	as	the	state	was	far	from	ditching	the	institution	as	it	often	had	a	cause	for	which	it	
could	be	used.	For	instance,	in	addition	to	their	role	in	the	maintenance	of	peace	and	security,	






regime’s	 self-help	 approach	 to	 development	 particularly	 the	 improvement	 of	 education,	
agriculture	and	 infrastructure.	Pesek	(2011,	p.	54)	conceptualises	campaigns	as	a	“temporary	
and	 concentrated	attempt	 to	 change	within	a	 short	 span	of	 time	particular	 aspects	of	 social	
configurations	 of	 a	 given	 society”.	 As	 in	 other	 newly	 independent	 African	 states,	 Barre’s	
																																								 																				
60	Participant	in	Commercial	Bank	Teashop	Discussion	June	13,	2014.	Hargeisa	Resident.	













of	 state	 agents,	 as	 tax	 collectors	 and	 mobilisers	 of	 labour	 for	 the	 state.	 According	 to	 the	




































is	 important	 to	note	that	while	signs	of	diversity	emerged	 in	 the	spatial	character	of	 the	city	
during	the	military	regime	mainly	due	to	the	improved	security,	the	state	was	unable	to	break	










reinforced	 the	utility	of	 clan	as	an	 important	element	 in	choosing	where	 to	stay	and	who	 to	
relate	to.	Furthermore,	I	argue	the	role	the	clan	continues	to	play	in	the	democratisation	process	
and	the	way	political	parties	use	it	or	abuse	it	reinforces	the	utility	of	clan	as	a	unit	of	identity.	
This,	 combined	 with	 the	 key	 roles	 the	 customary	 institutions	 continue	 to	 play	 in	mediating	
access	 to	 services	 in	 the	 post-conflict	 context,	 strengthens	 clannism	 and	 hence	 perpetuates	
segregation.				







important	 than	 ever	 before	 for	 security	 purposes	 in	 urban	 areas,	 causing	many	 people	who	
owned	land	in	areas	populated	by	other	clans	to	move	to	strongholds	of	their	clans	(APD,	2010).	











conflict	context	had	a	major	 impact	on	the	reestablishment	of	 local	government	 institutions.	
Attempts		at	establishing	local	administrative	structures	were	overshadowed	by	efforts	aimed	
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sure	 that	 the	 forces	 fighting	 for	 the	organisation	 are	 accountable	 to	 its	 command.	 If	 people	
wanted	 to	 provide	 supplies	 for	 the	 cause	 SNM	was	 fighting	 for,	 then	 they	 should	make	 all	










these	 issues	 and	 those	 who	 voice	 their	 concern	 would	 be	 branded	 as	
traitors.67	


















and	 the	 subjectivity	 inherent	 in	 the	 traditional	 public	 authorities	 where	 the	 individual	 is	
expected	to	pledge	their	allegiance	to	the	customary	institution	of	chieftaincy.	
Such	 division	 in	 allegiance	 became	 a	 recipe	 for	 the	 widespread	 post	 Barre	 deterioration	 in	
security	in	Hargeisa.	As	urban	safety	declined	between	1991	to	1993,	non	SNM	politicians	used	
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collection	 attempts.72	 The	 new	 mayor’s	 rearrangement	 of	 administrative	 structures	 was,	




As	 detailed	 in	 chapter	 two,	 traditional	 authorities	 played	 a	 significant	 role	 in	 the	 re-
establishment	of	 law	and	order	 in	 Somaliland	after	 the	war,	 helping	 the	 state	 to	disarm	 the	
militia	and	facilitating	dialogue	between	warring	clans.	As	a	result,	they	are	often	represented	
as	an	important	institution,	and	invoked	as	an	explanation	to	account	for	the	differences	in	state	
building	 processes	 between	 Somalia	 and	 Somaliland(Walls,	 2009).	 Advancing	 this	




Despite	 this	 romanticised	 representation,	 I	 argue	 that	 tensions	 characterise	 the	 relationship	
between	the	state	and	traditional	authorities	in	Somaliland,	and	specifically	in	Hargeisa.	These	
tensions	are	attributed	to	the	inability	of	the	state	and	the	customary	institutions	to	manage	the	
complex	 post-conflict	 political,	 cultural	 and	 social	 dynamics.	 While	 the	 statutory	 system	 is	




the	 harm	 they	 cause	 is	 more	 than	 the	 good	 they	 do	 for	 governance	 and	
maintenance	of	 law	and	order.	The	problem	now	is	the	fact	that	there	are	
																																								 																				





























enrol	 their	 services	 on	 issues	 related	 to	 peace	 and	 security.	 The	 process	 through	which	 the	
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parties;	 UDUB,	 Kulmiye	 and	 UCID.79	 Eleven	 councillors	 were	 elected	 on	 UDUB	 tickets	 and	
another	6	councillors	joined	them	from	the	parties	which	did	not	make	it	to	the	final	3	national	
parties.	This	made	the	number	of	the	ruling	party	councillors	17,	trailed	by	Kulmiye	which	had	4	
and	UCID	with	3.	 The	Mayor	 and	 the	deputy	mayor	 served	 as	 executive	 and	 the	 rest	 of	 the	
councillors	were	divided	into	4	committees	with	chairs,	deputies	and	secretaries.	The	city	was	
divided	 into	5	districts	and	one	councillor	was	put	 in	charge	of	each	district.	 In	other	words,	
every	councillor	also	had	another	executive	or	 ‘semi	executive’	position.	The	key	committees	
were	 the	 finance	 and	 the	 land	 committees	 but	 equally	 important	 were	 the	 social	 welfare	



























































town.	 The	 tax	 collectors	 placed	 their	 focus	 on	 the	 individuals	 that	 pay	most	 taxes	 so	 as	 to	
maximise	 their	 tax	 collection	 strategy.	 As	 the	 previous	 incentive-based	 strategy	 for	 tax	 base	
expansion	failed	to	bring	about	any	tangible	increase	in	the	number	of	tax	payers	in	the	city,	the	
new	mayor	approached	the	United	Nations	Habitat	programme	to	help	with	the	creation	of	a	






the	 town	 has	 increased	 the	 revenue	 of	 the	 local	 authority	 by	 a	 significant	 margin,	 300%.83		
Though	important	in	terms	of	local	government	capacity,		this	did	not	help	much	with	the	land	
conflict	problems	in	the	city	(as	we	shall	see	in	chapter	6).		
This	 section	 has	 shown	 that	 the	 focus	 of	 urban	 governance	 in	 the	 post-war	 period	was	 the	
reestablishment	of	urban	governance	structures	and	transition	 to	democracy,	and	redefining	
the	role	of	the	customary	institutions	such	as	the	Akils	in	the	political	and	security	dynamics	of	
the	 city.	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 the	 existing	 rifts	 between	 the	 SNM	 factions	 complicated	 the	










































This	 chapter	 focuses	on	urban	 land	 administration,	 past	 and	present.	 It	 provides	 a	historical	
overview	 of	 the	 colonial	 land	 management	 practices	 and	 their	 impact	 on	 shaping	 people’s	


















administration	and	 its	 legacies,	 particularly	 the	association	between	 land	administration	and	
appropriation,	and	the	late-colonial	attempt	to	register	individual	urban	landholding	for	elites	
and	 its	effects.	 In	the	second	section,	 I	present	evidence	for	postcolonial	 legal	continuities	 in	
land	administration.		In	this	postcolonial	period,	I	argue	that	urban	land	was	not	a	priority,	partly	
due	to	a	lack	of	capacity,	but	the	result	was	a	proliferation	of	land	conflicts,	which	reinforced	
the	 importance	of	clan	and	segregated	urban	spaces.	Finally,	 I	discuss	 the	 importance	of	 the	
2001	legal	and	policy	frameworks	for	urban	land	intervention	and	a	series	of	state/NGO	efforts	
to	regulate	urban	land.		

















is	manifest	 in	 the	 form	of	 spatial	 segregation	as	members	of	 the	same	clan	conglomerate	 in	
specific	chunks	of	the	city	to	increase	their	chance	of	survival	in	the	city.		
I	begin	this	examination	with	colonial	land	management	in	Somaliland,	which	can	be	traced	back	
to	 the	 early	 years	 of	 the	 protectorate’s	 formation	 when	 the	 government	 introduced	 the	








time	when	 the	Protectorate	was	 emerging	 from	a	protracted	 conflict	 following	 the	Mullah’s	
uprising.	This	act	was	minimalist	 in	its	first	version	mainly	focusing	on	political	control,	but	in	
1927	the	government	amended	the	ordinance	to	provide	colonial	officials	with	sweeping	powers	
of	 reordering	settlement	patterns	 in	 townships.	 It	 is	particularly	 relevant	 to	 the	 focus	of	 this	
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their	 buildings	without	 regard	 to	 the	 value	 of	 the	 site	whereas	 those	who	held	 government	
issued	 free	or	 leasehold	qualified	 for	payment	of	 the	 land	value	together	with	any	buildings,	
trees,	cultivation	et	cetera	on	it.86	The	introduction	and	use	over	subsequent	decades	of	these	
expropriation	rules	were	unfathomable	to	the	vast	majority	of	people	in	the	Protectorate,	and	










also	 shows	 that	 Somalis	 at	 the	 time	 could	 not	 imagine	 and	make	 sense	 of	why	 the	 colonial	
government	would	want	to	move	people	around	when	there	is	a	plenty	of	vacant	space	with	
which	 it	 could	 do	 whatever	 it	 wanted.	 It	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 land	 administrative	
regulations	both	to	colonial	power	and	to	popular	resistance	and	perceptions	of	its	illegitimacy.	
This	incomprehension	does	not	suggest	that	land	use	management	was	a	foreign	concept	to	the	










might	 be	 suitable	 for	 migration	 during	 the	 dry	 seasons	 basing	 their	 assessment	 on	 the	
environmental	footprints	of	the	preceding	season	(i.e.	rainfall)	while	farmers	used	to	enclose	
certain	parts	of	their	land	for	use	in	the	dry	seasons	when	supplies	might	be	less	abundant.	An	





quench	 their	 animals.	 So,	 it	 was	 a	 system	 based	 on	 mutual	 respect	 and	
agreement	between	the	clans.	The	problem	 is	 that	 the	traditional	systems	
was	 disrupted	 by	 foreign	 influences	 which	 increased	 the	 competition	 for	
resources.88	
The	 point	 here	 is	 that	 local	 people’s	 approach	 to	 land	 use	 management	 was	 based	 on	
consultation	 and	 voluntary	 adherence	 as	 opposed	 to	 colonial	 actions.	 Colonial	 interventions	
were	often	constituted	through	a	top	down	process	requiring	involuntary	enforcement	mainly	
shaped	 by	 disregard	 for	 local	 knowledge	 that	 cast	 doubt	 on	 people’s	 ability	 to	 govern	 their	
relationship	with	the	environment	in	a	mutually	beneficial	way.	In	relation	to	urban	space,	the	

















security.	Moreover,	 they	argued	 that	 the	occupation	of	 this	 land	 fell	outside	 the	category	of	
private	ownership	as	structures	were	not	permanent	and	owners	held	neither	title	deeds	nor	
paid	 taxes	hence	providing	 government	with	 sufficient	 grounds	 to	 remove	and	pay	 them	an	
amount	of	money	equivalent	to	the	simple	structures	on	the	land	and	not	the	land	value.89		





cost	 of	 	 temporary	 structures.	 In	 a	 letter	 dated	 on	 the	 23	 of	December	 1937,	 the	Governor	
announced	 that	 land	 along	 the	main	 street	would	 be	 expropriated	 to	 pave	 the	way	 for	 the	
construction	of	new	blocks	of	permanent	buildings.	Notices	to	this	effect	had	been	served	with	
the	 occupiers,	 giving	 them	 seven	 days	 to	 make	 the	 necessary	 arrangements	 for	 the	
expropriation.	 Sixteen	 dwellings	 were	 affected	 by	 this	 expropriation	 and	 a	 committee	 from	
various	agencies	including	the	Treasurer,	and	Chief	of	Customs,	Director	of	Public	Works	and	a	
‘leading	Somali	resident’	were	put	together	to	evaluate	the	cost	of	the	dwellings.	The	evaluators	






















exclusively	 and	2)	 private	ownership	where	 individuals	may	 carve	out	 a	 piece	of	 land	 in	 the	
village	or	urban	area	for	cultivation	or	permanent	settlement.	This	bottom-up	traditional	land	
management	approach	was	altered	incrementally	over	a	period	of	85	years	in	which	Somaliland	
was	 part	 of	 the	 British	 Empire	 mainly	 through	 a	 top-down	 process.	 The	 most	 significant	






consultation	might	have	been	 justified	on	 the	basis	 that	 there	was	 lack	of	 knowledge	about	
urban	 land	 issues	 in	 Somaliland	 as	 there	were	 very	 limited	 number	 of	 towns	 in	 the	 country	
notwithstanding	 the	 typical	 colonial	 mentality	 of	 underestimating	 local	 knowledge	 and	 the	






















of	 his	 Majesty	 by	 virtue	 of	 any	 treaty,	 convention	 or	 agreement,	 or	 of	 his	 Majesty’s	




the	 Crown.96	 He	 argued	 that	 “the	 only	 crown	 land	 is	 that	 which	 has	 been	 acquired	 for	 the	








the	 eyes	 of	 the	 public,	 who	 continued	 to	 perceive	 it	 as	 a	 colonial	 project	 designed	 for	 the	
subjugation	 and	 confiscation	 of	 their	 property	 without	 equitable	 compensation.98	 The	
unpopularity	of	histories	of	 land	administration	 in	both	urban	and	rural	contexts,	particularly	
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As	 evident	 above,	 colonial	 administration	 was	 a	 top-down	 process	 characterised	 by	 lack	 of	
consultation	 with	 the	 public	 and	 local	 authorities.	 This	 authoritarian	 state	 culture	 had	 a	
significant	impact	on	the	future	of	urban	land	management	in	the	country	as	most	of	the	colonial	
land	 policies	 and	 laws	were	 retained	 in	 the	 postcolonial	 period.	 	 The	 continuities	 are	more	
striking	 than	 the	 changes.	 Attempts	 aimed	 at	 change	 often	 failed.	 For	 instance,	 in	 1960	 the	
government	appointed	a	Parliamentary	Commission	to	deal	with	land	reform,		but	after	six	years	
of	work	they	came	up	with	a	draft	which	failed	to	pass	in	parliament	(Besteman,	1990).	From	















government’s	 failure	 to	 formulate	 new	 land	 management	 regulations	 permitted	 District	






















Governor	 of	 North	 Western	 Region	 of	 which	 Hargeisa	 was	 the	 capital,	 removed	 informal	
settlements	near	the	city	centre	in	order	to	improve	the	city’s	image.	Evictees	were	resettled	in	
peri	 urban	areas	 South	of	 the	 city	with	 limited	access	 to	water	 and	other	 essential	 services,	
leading	 to	 a	 mixed	 reaction,	 discussed	 below.	 It	 is	 important	 to	 understand	 how	 particular	






The	 most	 prominent	 such	 scheme	 of	 eviction	 and	 resettlement	 was	 the	 movement	 of	 the	
Dunbuluq	 neighbourhood	 to	 the	 outskirts	 of	 the	 city.	 Dunbuluq	 at	 the	 time	 was	 a	
neighbourhood	consisting	mainly	of	Garhajis	and	Arab	clans.	Critics	point	out	that	the	removal	
of	 people	 and	 expropriation	 of	 land	 was	 done	 in	 a	 manner	 not	 dissimilar	 to	 the	 urban	










The	 government	 version,	 however,	 brushed	 such	 criticism	 aside.	 According	 to	 the	 former	
















road	 networks.	 In	 opposition	 to	 representations	 of	 peripheral	 neighbourhoods	 as	 entirely	
excluded	from	the	social	fabric	of	the	city,	the	study	found	that	various	forms	of	communication	
and	networks	have	enabled	evictees	get	access	to	opportunities	and	services	for	those	living	in	



















of	 the	 city	 given	 the	 shift	 to	areas	predominantly	populated	by	 their	 respective	 clans.	Many	
people	believe	that	the	government	had	an	opportunity	to	alter	the	city’s	settlement	pattern	as	
these	 exercises	 could	 have	 been	 used	 to	 promote	 spatial	 integration	 and	 to	 break	 up	
concentrations	of	particular	clans.108	It	is	important	to	mention	that	these	evictions	took	place	
at	 a	 time	 when	 the	 government	 announced	 a	 new	 state	 policy	 on	 eradicating	 and	 burying	
clanism	 in	 public	 life.	 	 Yet	 the	 land	 management	 practices	 of	 the	 state	 were	 in	 practice	 in	
































2008).	 Similarly,	 in	 Erigavo,	 grazing	 reserves	were	 established	 by	 the	 livestock	 development	
agency	 for	 the	 formation	 of	 cooperative	 societies	 aimed	 at	 empowering	 pastoralists.	 The	
cooperatives	were	designed	to	consist	of	45	households	each	contributing	10	sheep	and	1	cow.	
However,	the	programme	was	counterproductive	as	it	was	exploited	by	elites	who	bought	off	
the	 shares	 of	 those	 unable	 to	 contribute	 the	 10	 sheep	 and	 1	 cow	 required	 for	 cooperative	
membership	(Norton	and	Flyktningeråd,	2008).	In	both	cases,	the	land	tenure	reforms	were	seen	
as	government	encroachment	on	pastoralists’	traditional	rights	of	pasture	and	watering.	
It	 is	 important	 to	 point	 out	 that	 urban	 land	management	was	 neglected	 during	 the	military	
regime	in	Somalia,	aside	from	the	evictions	discussed	above.	Robleh	and	Hussen	(1977)	cited	in	









far	 the	most	extensive	piece	of	 legislation	dealing	with	 land	management	 in	the	postcolonial	
period.109	One	of	the	cornerstones	of	the	new	legislation,	which	also	had	implications	for	urban	
contexts,	was	 the	 fact	 that	 it	 not	only	enhanced	 the	authoritarian	 colonial	 approach	 to	 land	
																																								 																				
109	This	legislation	paved	the	way	for	the	establishment	of	development	cooperatives	and	also	enhanced	
the	 existing	 agricultural	 crash	 programmes	 through	 which	 land	 was	 allocated	 land	 to	 government	
employees	and	graduates	of	agricultural	colleges.	















deeds	 for	 unclaimed	 land110	 at	 a	 time	when	 the	 country	was	 going	 through	 steep	 economic	
decline	worsened	by	insurgencies	in	the	North.	Secondly,	it	enabled	them	to	salvage	some	of	
their	savings	at	a	time	when	the	country	was	facing	high	rate	of	inflation.	Roth	(1989)	notes	that	
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traditional	 systems	 while	 also	 getting	 access	 to	 government	 documentation	 guaranteeing	
security	 of	 tenure	 (Besteman,	 1990).	 Besteman	 (1990)	 defines	 tenure	 security	 in	 the	 Somali	
context	“as	the	[land	owners]	perception	that	s/he	will	be	able	to	sustain	rights	to	use	the	land	
and	 obtain	 continuing	 benefits	 from	 investment	 in	 the	 land”.	 The	 introduction	 of	 land	





population	 pressure,	 rising	 land	 values,	 land	 speculation,	 unequal	 access	 to	 land	 under	
customary	tenure,	or	encroaching	control	over	land	by	a	dominant	group,	legal	title	conferred	
by	the	state	may	increase	tenure	security”(Besteman,	1990).	But,	under	the	military	reforms,	
this	was	 not	 the	 case	 and	 the	measures	 contained	 in	 the	 agricultural	 land	 law	were	mainly	
counter-productive.	One	of	the	reasons	why	customary	tenure	continued	to	be	seen	as	more	










example,	 customary	 land	 tenure	 can,	 under	 certain	 circumstances,	 provide	 individuals	 with	





measure	 through	 which	 the	 government	 wants	 to	 impose	 further	 punishment	 for	 their	










employment	 opportunities	 were	 higher.	 However,	 the	 heightened	 opportunities	 for	 land	













regulatory	 system	 and	 hence	 fosters	 the	 continued	 reliance	 on	 the	 clan	 network	 and	 hence	
segregation.			
















cope	with	 the	 demand	 and	 pressure	 placed	 on	 it	 by	 such	 rapid	 growth.	 Attempts	 aimed	 at	
bringing	 about	 reforms	 were	 mainly	 unsuccessful.	 This	 was	 partly	 attributable	 to	 the	 non-
existence	 of	 previous	 land	 records	 and	municipal	 bylaws.	 Land	 reforms	 in	 Somaliland	were,	
therefore,	started	from	scratch	as	a	parliamentary-led	 legislative	process	aimed	at	producing	












According	to	this	 law,	the	municipal	departments	directly	 involved	 in	 local	 land	management	
are	the	departments	of	land,	physical	assets,	and	land	records	transfer	(Bruyas,	2006).		At	the	
central	 state	 level,	 the	 ministries	 of	 agriculture,	 pastoral	 development	 and	 environment,	
interior,	health,	communication,	mineral	resources	and	water,	the	Ministry	of	public	works,		and	
the	 parliamentary	 subcommittee	 on	 natural	 resources	 and	 environment	 are	 all	 institutions	
concerned	with	urban	land	management	(Farah,	undated	).		
Aside	from	the	large	number	of	ministries	and	departments	involved,	the	provisions	of	the	new	
wide-ranging	urban	land	law	are	numerous	and	detailed.	 	This	 in	 itself	did	not	make	for	easy	
implementation.		Nor	was	the	law	widely	understood.		In	addition,	McAuslan	(2006)	criticises	
this	urban	 land	management	 law	for	 its	 tendency	to	presume	the	existence	of	a	master	plan	
[which	at	the	time	of	data	collection	did	not	exist]	and	its	central	concern	with	revising	plans	
rather	 than	putting	 in	place	guidelines	on	which	 	plans	 could	be	made	and	 land	 registration	
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problems	could	be	addressed.	 In	2004,	 the	municipality	of	Hargeisa	 in	collaboration	with	UN	
Habitat	started	a	registration	of	properties	exercise	where	information	was	gathered	through	
GIS		using	satellite	digital	images	and	GPS	devices	(Turkstra,	2008).	The	idea	was	to	strengthen	
the	 local	 state’s	ability	 to	manage	urban	 land	by	developing	a	 reliable	cadastral	 system.113	A	
major	problem	with	the	system,	however,	was	that	it	did	not	record	the	dimensions	of	the	plots	
as	this	was	perceived	as	information	that	would	increase	boundary	conflicts.	This	limited	the	use	








documents,	 unrecorded	 community	 knowledge,	 land	 registration,	 boundary	 definition	 and	
cadastral	 survey”.	 They	 advance	 this	 cadastral	 system	 not	 only	 as	 a	 way	 of	 enhancing	 land	
registration	processes	but	also	as	a	way	of	improving	access	to	land.		
The	land	titling	system	is	one	of	the	major	contributors	to	land	conflicts	in	Hargeisa.	Owing	to	
the	 lack	 of	 transparent,	 accountable	 and	 stringent	 land	 registration	 mechanisms,	 irregular	
issuance	 of	 titles	 is	 not	 uncommon.	While	 in	 general	 this	 negatively	 affects	 landowners	 by	
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administration	 and	 the	 allocation	 of	 urban	 land	 (including	 land	 within	 the	 immediate	
surrounding	 of	 the	 city)	 the	 prerogative	 of	 local	 government	 particularly	 the	 executive	
committee	of	the	councils.	Land	located	on	the	fringes	of	the	city,	according	to	this	law,	remains	
in	 the	 hands	 of	 those	 who	 hold	 titles,	 but	 if	 the	 owner	 decides	 to	 convert	 it	 into	 a	 built	
environment	 such	 residential	 or	 business	 buildings,	 30%	 of	 the	 land	 will	 be	 taken	 by	 the	
municipality.	The	mountainous	areas	surrounding	the	city	where	cultivation	is	impossible	cannot	
be	 recognized	as	 farmland	and	 their	occupation	 is	 illegal	and	subject	 to	confiscation	without	









While	 the	urban	 land	 law	makes	a	 significant	attempt	at	delineating	 the	vertical	 relationship	
between	institutions	dealing	with	urban	land	administration,	i.e.	central	and	local	authorities,	it	
fails	 to	 cater	 for	 the	 horizontal	 relationship	 and	 interface	 between	 the	 local	 authorities	












way	 by	mobilising	 various	 actors	 that	 include	 the	 traditional	 leaders	 and	









regulatory	 framework	 for	urban	 land	management.	This	produces	both	 lack	of	accountability	
among	officials	and	lack	of	trust	from	the	public.				
This	lack	of	political	will	is	rooted	in	the	way	people	come	to	power	in	the	first	
place.	 People	 are	 not	 voted	 in	 because	of	 their	 political	 agenda.	 They	are	
voted	 in	 because	 of	 their	 affiliation	 with	 clans.	 So	 instead	 of	 politicians	
developing	programs	for	the	public	to	be	able	to	decide,	votes	are	solicited	













public	and	 therefore	 they	don't	 care.	The	 senior	 civil	 servants	also	are	 the	
same….they	 do	 things	 as	 they	 wish…..because	 after	 all	 they	 will	 be	





if	 government	 officials	 attempt	 to	 implement	 policies,	 their	 effort	 is	
undermined	by	people	going	to	their	seniors	and	saying	official	X	and	official	
Y	are	up	to	no	good	and	they	want	to	make	the	public	go	against	you.119	
Secondly,	 the	 weak	 regulatory	 system	 is	 attributed	 to	 government’s	 susceptibility	 to	
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interference	 with	 due	 process.	 There	 are	 two	 kinds	 of	 corruptions;	 active	








formulate	 plans	 incorporating	 some	 level	 of	 consultation.	 Thus	 far	 the	 only	 plan	 involving	
participatory	 planning	 is	 the	 recent	 constitution	 of	 District	 Development	 Framework	 (DDF)	
documents	 aimed	 at	 identifying	 the	 social	 and	 economic	 as	 well	 as	 physical	 development	
deficiencies	in	the	city	and	priorities	for	intervention.	The	DDF	identified	several	priority	areas	
for	 immediate	 attention	 such	 as	 the	need	 for	 improvement	 in	 physical	 infrastructure,	water	
supplies	and	dilapidated	pipelines	and	access	to	healthcare	(HM,	2010).		
While	 such	participatory	planning	can	 facilitate	change	 in	 the	 top	down	mentality	of	making	
regulations,	it	is	important	to	point	out	the	anomalies	in	such	exercises.	One	major	challenge	is	
the	fact	that	people	rarely	come	to	consultation	sessions	unless	they	are	paid	a	daily	subsistence	
allowance.123	 This	 demand	 for	 money	 developed	 from	 a	 culture	 in	 which	 the	 INGOs	 pay	
participants	 for	consultation	so	as	to	make	their	programs	 look	consultative.	 In	reality,	 those	
who	 report	 for	 such	 forums	are	 a	 group	of	people	who	make	a	habit	 of	 earning	 from	 these	
practices,	undermining	the	value	of	consultation.			
















governance	 practices	 inhibits	 access	 to	 land	which	 is	 one	 of	 three	major	 obstacles	 to	 urban	
development	in	Somaliland,	according	to	panel	discussion	facilitated	by	the	World	Bank	(WB,	
2014).	 While,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 clan-based	 segregation	 may	 give	 an	 impression	 of	 social	





exclusionary	 state	 land	 management	 practices.	 For	 instance,	 the	 legal	 framework	 leads	 to	














et	 cetera	and	 temporary	 residencies	 consisting	of	 Somali	 traditional	mats	and	houses	made	of	 ceiling	
boards.	Temporary	structures	will	not	require	to	have	plans	whereas	the	permanent	structures	should	
have	building	plans	(Republic	of	Somaliland,	2002	amended	in	2008).	
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in	 prime	 area	 facing	 a	major	 road	 and	 he/she	 is	 unable	 to	 build	 on	 it,	 the	municipality	 can	









Further	 challenges	 face	 the	 poor	 living	 in	 peri-urban	 locations	 by	 the	 agricultural	 land	 law	
introduced	 in	1999.	Article	6	of	 this	 law	–	which	also	applies	 to	urban	contexts	as	 the	city	 is	
increasingly	expanding	to	agricultural	and	pastoral	land	in	peri-urban	areas	–		limits	allocation	
of	 land	 to	 one	 plot	 of	 eight	 hectares	 which	 cannot	 be	 sold	 for	 three	 years	 (Republic	 of	
Somaliland,	1999).		For	many	poor	people	waiting	for	three	years	to	sell	their	land	is	a	luxury	
they	cannot	afford.	While	wealthier	people	 in	 the	city	access	peri-urban	 land	 in	 the	name	of	
investment	and	development,	poor	people	do	not	have	 the	ability	 to	organise	 the	 resources	
necessary	 for	 acquiring	 land	 in	 the	 name	 of	 development.	 According	 to	 article	 12	 of	 the	
Somaliland	Investment	policy,	land	given	for	development	should	be	built	up	within	one	year.127	
But	businessmen	rarely	conform	to	this	requirement	yet	are	not	subjected	to	eviction	whereas	











128	 Allocation	 of	 plots	 for	 residential	 reasons	 will	 have	 to	 be	 advertised	 in	 noticeboards	 and	 the	
newspapers	so	as	to	allow	those	who	want	a	dispute	the	ownership	time	to	raise	their	concerns.	
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unable	 to	 meet	 their	 daily	 basic	 needs	 (WB,	 2014).	 According	 to	 King	 et	 al.	 (2003),	 poor	









business	 in	 Somaliland.	 Poor	 and	 weak	 regulatory	 and	 enforcement	 systems	 are	 partly	
responsible	for	this	challenge.	According	to	the	Academy	for	Peace	and	Development	(2010),	










the	National	 Urban	 Planning	 Board	 has	 the	 right	 to	 issue	 orders	 of	 confiscating	 properties	 for	 public	








cost	 of	 acquiring	 a	 construction	 permit	 forces	 many	 small	 companies	 and	 people	 to	 build	
without	a	permit	and	then	seek	to	legalise	their	ownership	afterwards.	As	access	to	land	in	the	
post-conflict	context	 is	 increasingly	becoming	difficult	 for	 individuals	from	poor	backgrounds,	
evasion	of	authorities	has	become	inevitable	for	many	poor	people	to	put	a	roof	over	their	head.	
The	state	is	particularly	susceptible	to	being	undermined	in	areas	where	individuals	can	have	





applicants	 first	 before	 it	 legalises,	 this	 would	 have	 probably	 altered	 the	






way	 alienating	 the	 vast	 majority	 of	 urban	 residents	 through	 corruption.	 Affiliation	 to	 and	
membership	 of	 particular	 clans	 and	 remaining	 within	 vicinity	 dominated	 by	 one’s	 clan	 is	
therefore	an	essential	mechanism	to	resist	unfavourable	government	policies	and	decisions.	In	
short,	abject	poverty	coupled	with	the	failure	of	the	state	to	regulate	access	to	land	and	conflict	



















postcolonial	 civilian	 government	 nor	 the	 subsequent	 socialist	 land	 management	 regime	
introduced	during	the	military	administration	involved	public	consultation.	Similarly,	during	the	
post-conflict	period,	 land	management	practices	remained	top	down	in	sharp	contrast	to	the	




negative	 public	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 state,	 reproducing	 the	 endearment	 of	 people	 to	
customary	institutions	and	lineage	identity	and	by	implication	settlements	patterns	along	clan	
lines.		
Having	 discussed	 urban	 land	 administration	 in	 Somaliland,	 the	 next	 chapter	 discusses	 the	
dynamics	of	adjudication	mechanisms	for	urban	land	conflict	to	demonstrate	how	resource	and	














city,	Hargeisa	 is	particularly	reeling	with	such	problems	because	 it	 is	 increasingly	becoming	a	
magnet	 for	 rural-urban	migrations,	 relocations	and	 investment	 from	 the	diaspora,	as	well	 as	
return	movements	from	refugee	camps	around	the	country.		The	city	also	hosts	refugees	from	
the	South	and	internally	displaced	people.	The	problem	is	exacerbated	by	the	lack	of	coherent	
means	 through	which	 such	 conflicts	 can	be	 speedily	 and	 justly	 resolved.	 This	 is	 because	 the	
justice	 landscape	 in	 Somaliland	 is	 characterised	 by	 the	 coexistence	 of	 plural	 (at	 times)	
competing,	contradictory	and	occasionally	complementary	sets	of	laws	i.e.	statutory,	Islamic	and	
customary	 laws.	 In	 this	 chapter,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	manner	 in	which	 conflicts	 are	 adjudicated	
reinforces	the	city’s	clan-based	spatial	character.	This	is	to	say	that	the	failure	of	the	statutory	
system	 to	 manage	 conflict	 or	 enforce	 judicial	 decisions	 has	 eroded	 and	 undermined	 public	
confidence	in	the	state.	I	also	show	that	this	ineffective	justice	landscape	marginalised	the	poor.	
Consequently,	 the	poor	and	others	who	 lost	 trust	 in	the	system	rely	on	adjudication	by	non-













customary	 law,	 Islamic	sharia	and	statutory	 laws.	According	to	UN	(2006,	p.	35),	“traditional,	
religious,	and	secular	(modern)	systems,	functioning	in	parallel,	regulate	a	wide	range	of	affairs,	
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Owing	 to	 its	 popular	 familiarity,	 heer	 remains	 strong,	 and	 has	 outlasted	 the	 collapse	 of	 the	
country,	playing	an	important	role	in	the	restoration	of	peace	and	stability	in	the	nation.	Thorne	
(2011)	points	out	 that	 the	 informal	 justice	mechanism	 in	Somalia	has	 taken	 the	place	of	 the	
statutory	 system	 or	 complements	 it	 where	 both	 exist.	 The	 author	 rightly	 criticises	 the	
assumption	inherent	in	many	studies	of	a		justice	vacuum	created	by	the	collapse	of	the	state,	







customary	 law	 to	 fill	 the	 gap	 left	 by	 the	 statutory	 state	 laws.	 This	 problematic	 assumption	
inflates	the	value	of	the	so-called	formal	by	assuming	that	people	were	more	inclined	to	use	the	










argues	 that	 universality	 alone	may	 fall	 short	 of	 explaining	 the	 survival	 of	 heer	 amidst	 state	
collapse.	He	emphasises	rather	the	conservativeness	of	Somali	society	and	resistance	to	foreign	
influence;	the	suspicion	and	mistrust	they	direct	at	the	statutory	laws;	and	the	respect	they	have	
for	 their	 own	 customary	 laws,	 which	 they	 regard	 as	 superior	 to	 the	 codified	 statutory	 laws	
introduced	 by	 the	 colonial	 powers.	 Thorne	 observes	 that	 the	 limitations	 of	 	 customary	 laws	
include	their	failure	to	keep	pace	with	changing	urban	contexts	where	“defining	lines	between	
clans	become	blurred”	(2011).	This	is,	however,	contradicted	by	the	evidence	emerging	from	the	
settlement	 patterns	 in	 Hargeisa	 that	 I	 present	 here.	 	 Yet	 there	 are	 drawbacks,	 because	





There	 have,	 however,	 been	 attempts	 aimed	 at	 bringing	 heer	 into	 international	 standards.	
According	to	Namibia	and	Ubink	(2011),	elders	in	Burao	approached	the	Danish	Refugee	Council	
(DRC)	 in	 2003	 with	 an	 idea	 of	 reforming	 	 customary	 law	 so	 as	 to	 bring	 it	 in	 line	 with	 the	
international	 standards.	 The	 conference	 in	 Burao	 agreed	 on	 the	 elimination	 of	 communal	






have	 been	 related	 to	 other	 social	 changes	 given	 the	 fact	 that	 “awareness	 of	 the	 National	
Declarations	among	the	general	population	was	found	to	be	minimal”	(Namibia	and	Ubink,	2011,	
p.	15).	In	other	words,	if	awareness	of	the	declaration	was	so	low,	it	is	difficult	to	assume	that	
these	 declarations	 had	 made	 changes	 in	 the	 public	 mind-set	 towards	 these	 issues.	 Unlike	

















enjoy	 the	 trust	 nor	 the	 resources	 required	 for	 its	 highly	 bureaucratic	 nature.	 This	weakness	
allows	 both	 the	 customary	 and	 the	 sharia	 laws	 to	 compete	 and	 at	 times	 outperform	 the	













only	 in	 the	 rural	 areas	 but	 also	 in	 towns.	 	 The	 civilian	 Somali	 government	 established	 a	




in	 practice	 Northern	 judges	 used	 their	 previous	 laws	 while	 Southerners	 continued	 with	 the	
Italian	system.	Equally	the	military	regime	made	an	attempt	to	reform	the	system	and	in	1973	















of	 recycling	 the	state	of	 justice	 that	existed	before	 the	collapse	of	 the	state.	 In	other	words,	
these	efforts	 failed	to	devise	a	 form	of	 legal	empowerment	different	 from	those	of	the	past.	
Namibia	 and	 Ubink	 (2011)	 point	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 legal	 empowerment	 in	 post-conflict	
contexts,	and	the	need	to	address	characteristically	overlapping	and	sometimes	contradicting	
plural	legal	systems.		
















to	 comply…The	 problem	 of	 legitimacy	 is,	 then,	 to	 explain	 how	 a	 state	 can	 have	 the	 moral	










touch	 with	 the	 international	 conventions	 on	 equality	 and	 rights.	 Collective	 responsibility,	
unequal	 representation,	and	 immunity	present	problems	 to	 the	 future	 integration	of	 judicial	
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include	 that	 they	 are	 cheaper	 and	 less	 time	 demanding	 as	 customary	 decisions	 are	 reached	
within	a	reasonable	timeframe	(APD,	2008).		
The	 mediation	 process	 of	 customary	 laws	 focusses	 mainly	 on	 bringing	 about	 a	 solution	 to	
problems	rather	than	deciding	on	who	is	right	or	wrong	in	a	dispute.	Critics,	however,	argue	that	
mediation	 teams	are	not	neutral	as	 they	are	drawn	 from	the	disputing	parties.137	Moreover,	
further	criticism	is	directed	at	the	fact	that	customary	laws	can	be	reactive	rather	than	proactive.	













is	 given	 an	 opportunity	 to	 accept	 or	 contest	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 the	 claims	 submitted	 by	 the	
plaintiff	and	is	asked	to	present	evidence	for	his/her	objection.	Sixthly,	the	defendant	is	asked	
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Islamic	 law	 in	 relation	 to	 land	does	not	 just	 sit	 alongside	 statutory	 and	 customary	 laws	 as	 a	











applied	 without	 sufficient	 evidence.	 The	 reason	 for	 which	 this	 diplomatic	
framing	of	the	situation	is	necessary	is	because	of	the	fact	that	it	is	generally	
unacceptable	 among	 the	 public	 to	 oppose	 Islamic	 sharia	 for	 religious	
reasons.139	
Like	 the	 customary	 institutions,	 the	 Islamic	 court	 places	 emphasis	 on	 harmonising	 the	
relationship	between	the	plaintiff	and	the	defendant	and	they	do	so	by	firstly	reminding	both	
sides	of	the	sanctity	of	the	sharia	laws.	A	defining	feature	of	the	sharia	court	is	the	fact	that	the	








grant,	 leasing	a	 land	 from	the	state,	 charitable	 land,	 reserved	 land	 for	a	defined	purpose,	“unviolated	
zones	of	land	and	the	office	of	public	inspection”	(APD,	2008).	
139	Interviewee	21	August	15,	2014.	Religious	Leader.	














decision	on	 the	basis	 of	 the	 legal	mechanism	available	 to	 the	 judges.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 land	
disputes,	more	often	than	not	decisions	become	unsatisfactory	for	one	of	the	parties	and	this	




In	 addition,	 the	 legal	 codes	 and	 complex	 terminology	 used	 in	 the	 statutory	 system	 are	 not	
commonly	understood	by	the	public,	 resulting	 in	apprehension	and	 lack	of	confidence	 in	 the	
judiciary	system.	Moreover,	the	statutory	courts	are	accused	of	being	very	corrupt	in	addition	
















In	 the	customary	system,	conflicting	parties	are	 represented	by	people	 from	their	 respective	
clans	 and	 the	 process	 has	 some	 degree	 of	 security	 built	 into	 it	 where	 mediators	 consider	
repercussions	that	could	result	from	neglecting	the	interest	of	one	of	the	parties.	Since	internally	
displaced	 people	 do	 not	 belong	 to	 dominant	 clans	 with	 political	 clout	 in	 the	 city,	 they	 are	
marginalised	by	the	customary	institutions.	The	same	is	the	case	for	the	minority	groups.	
Generally,	 judicial	 proceedings	 rely	 heavily	 on	 testimonies	 (as	will	 be	 seen	 in	 the	 court	 case	
discussed	in	detail)	and	it	is	difficult	for	the	poor	to	bring	witnesses	to	court	as	witnesses	usually	
do	not	come	to	the	courts	unless	they	are	paid.	Similarly,	it	is	difficult	for	the	poor	to	gather	the	

















seek	 a	 different	 avenue	 for	 their	 representation.	 the	 legal	 aid	 clinic	 takes	 a	 small	 amount	 of	 cases	
determined	on	assessment	for	their	need.	








	men	are	often	prepared	 to	pay	 corrupt	officials	or	at	 least	 seem	 to	know	
exactly	how	to	go	about	it	whereas	woman	suffer	because	there	might	be	a	
perception	 among	 the	 officials	 that	 women	 either	 pay	 little	 or	 not	 at	 all	
therefore	they	might	be	subjected	to	more	bureaucracies	than	the	men.145	
Women’s	 ability	 to	 access	 justice	 services	 is	 also	 inhibited	 by	 the	 fact	 that	 the	 judicial	
environment	is	also	gendered	as	most	of	the	staff	working	in	the	justice	system	are	men	who:		





























were	 independent	of	 clans.	Quite	 the	opposite,	 as	 judges	may	have	been	dependent	on	 the	
political	clout	of	their	respective	clans	which	implicitly	or	explicitly	provided	them	with	a	degree	
of	protection	for	their	personal	safety	and	security.150		






















far	brought	about	a	significant	change	 in	 justice	delivery.	This	 lack	of	change	 is	attributed	 to	
either	 inability	or	 lack	of	commitment	 to	deal	with	 the	problem	effectively.	One	 interviewee	
sums	up	the	situation	saying	that	the	




commitment	 to	 improve	 the	 judiciary	 infrastructure	 and	 system	 in	 the	




country.	 The	 judge’s	mobility	 is	 limited	and	most	of	 the	 courts	don't	 have	
transport	of	their	own.152	
Moreover,	 the	 judicial	 system	 is	 politicised	 and	 subject	 to	 interference	 from	 the	 executive.	
Sensitive	cases	are	allocated	to	judges	who	may	steer	the	case	in	the	direction	the	state	wants.	
Such	interference	happens	in	a	systemic	way	where	the	chairman	of	the	judges	is	called	by	senior	



















effort	 in	 enriching	 themselves	 and	 protecting	 their	 jobs	 by	 not	 going	 against	 the	will	 of	 the	
executive.	Judges	also	avoid	becoming	jobless	in	the	streets	for	security	reasons,	as	they	may	










senior	 judges,	 Director	 General	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	 Justice	 and	 the	 Director-General	 of	 the	
Ministry	 of	 Labour.	 The	 other	 four	 are	 appointed	 by	 the	 upper	 and	 lower	 chambers	 of	
Parliament.	 The	 role	 of	 the	 Justice	 Commission	 includes	 improving	 the	 justice	 system	 and	
removing	 and	 transferring	 judges154	 but	 a	 number	 of	 people	 from	 the	 legal	 community	 in	
Hargeisa	told	me	that	the	Commission	is	used	to	manipulate	the	justice	system	as:		
all	those	who	are	represented	in	the	Commission	have	somehow	power	over	
the	 delivery	 of	 the	 justice	 services.	 For	 instance,	 if	 you	 clash	 with	 the	




154	 The	 quorum	 is	 usually	 five	 and	 agenda	 is	 proposed	 by	 the	 chief	 justice.	 The	 chief	 justice	 is	 not	
independent	for	his	job	as	he	is	indirectly	controlled	by	the	executive	through	the	Parliament.	







Commission	 and	 the	 head	 of	 the	 Justice	 Commission	 himself	 is	 subject	 to	
political	interference.155	
The	other	form	of	interference	is	that	which	comes	from	clans.	Clan	pressure	can	be	interpreted	
as	a	response	to	the	poor	performance	of	 the	 judiciary	system	 in	the	country.	 In	such	cases,	
people	explore	the	relational	web	of	the	clan	and	try	to	find	somebody	who	is	related	to	the	
judge.	The	practice	is	usually	that:		




available	 way	 but	 those	 who	 resist	 the	 clan	 pressure	 face	 some	 sort	 of	
labelling	in	their	community.156	




also	 cheaper.	While	 customary	 institutions	 have	 provided	 people	with	 an	 alternative	means	
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another	 in	 a	 customary	 legal	 environment	 characterised	 by	 multiplicity	 of	 institutions,	
competition	and	coexistence.		





contradiction,	competition,	and	coexistence	of	 this	plural	 justice	 is	managed	to	some	degree	









Law	which	 empowered	 local	 authorities	 to	mediate	 land	 conflicts	 as	 a	matter	 of	 peace	 and	
conciliation	 (Republic	 of	 Somaliland,	 2002b).	 In	 2005,	 however,	 this	 was	 changed	 and	 land	
dispute	 adjudication	 was	 transferred	 to	 the	 formal	 courts	 (APD,	 2008).	 In	 2002,	 an	
administrative	Land	Commission	was	established	in	accordance	with	the	urban	land	law,	which	
was	amended	in	2008.	The	Commission	consists	of	seven	members	from	the	ministries	of	public	









cannot	 change	 a	 member	 and	 replace	 him	 with	 someone	 less	 the	 he	 is	 legally	 discharged	 from	 the	
Commission.	






contexts,	 there	 are	 limitations	 on	 their	 jurisdiction.	 For	 instance,	 the	 commission	 cannot	
adjudicate	 land	 conflicts	 in	 which	 a	 court’s	 decision	 has	 already	 been	made,	 where	 land	 is	
located	in	an	area	beyond	the	urban	master	plan,		pastoral	land	in	rural	areas,	public	land,	and	












where	 both	 parties	 lay	 claim	 to	 	 vacant	 land	 where	 the	 Commission	 is	 not	 convinced	 that	
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Similarly,	 public	 land	 available	 in	 the	 urban	 periphery	 has	 decreased	 as	 the	 city	 is	 currently	
expanding	 to	 farms	 previously	 owned	 by	 people	 who	 hold	 formal	 title	 deeds.	 Yet	 the	








Between	 2009	 and	 2013,	 the	 Commission	 handled	 323	 cases.	 Only	 20	 of	 these	 cases	 were	
handled	in	the	first	year,	2009.	This	number	almost	doubled	in	the	following	year.	Similarly,	2011	
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water162	 and	 as	 a	 result	 land	 in	 this	 area	 remains	 expensive.	 Equally,	 it	 had	 significant	 state	
properties	 and	 the	 elites	 of	 the	 previous	 government	 were	 mainly	 housed	 in	 this	
neighbourhood.	 At	 present,	 a	 number	 of	 international	 NGOs	 have	 their	 bases	 in	 this	
neighbourhood.	On	the	other	hand,	Ga’an	Libaax	is	within	very	close	proximity	of	the	city	centre	




Land	 disputes	 are	 some	 of	 the	 most	 pressing	 urban	 issues	 that	 the	 post-conflict	 state	 in	
Somaliland	faces.	Urban	authorities	across	the	country	are	confronted	with	serious	land	issues	
ranging	 from	 the	 inadequate	 	 land	 registry	 to	 encroachment	 of	 public	 space	 and	 illegal	
appropriation	 of	 peri-urban	 land	 (King	 et	 al.,	 2003).	 The	 vast	majority	 of	 these	 conflicts	 are	









rulings.	 Provision	 of	 evidence	 is	 governed	 by	 Islamic	 law	 and	 the	 other	 administrative	 laws	









164	 Testimonies	 are	 considered	 as	 crucial	 evidence	 in	 line	 with	 the	 Islamic	 law	 when	 proving	 on	 or	
disproving	ownership	of	land.	
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five	or	seven	members	 for	each	case	submitted	to	the	Commission.166	 In	the	first	sitting,	 the	
committee	 sorts	 out	 procedural	 issues,	 i.e.	 both	 sides	 are	 represented	 in	 the	 hearing	 and	
ensuring	 that	 lawyers	 of	 both	 sides	 have	 had	 the	 opportunity	 of	 speaking	 to	 the	 sides	 they	




resolve	 their	 issues	 by	 1)	 agreeing	 within	 themselves	 through	 negotiation,	 2)	 nominating	 a	















166	 The	 number	 of	 the	 Commissioners	 for	 mediation	 is	 determined	 by	 the	 nature	 of	 the	 case	 to	 be	
mediated.	
167	 There	 are	 two	 forms	 of	 restrictions,	 one	 imposed	 on	 one-party	 or	 another	 imposed	 on	 all	 parties	
involved	in	the	dispute.	The	Commission	can	impose	restriction	on	an	ongoing	construction,	processing	
of	ownership	papers.	






The	case	discussed	 in	 this	 section	pitted	Mahamed168	 (hereafter	 referred	as	plaintiff)	 against	
Marwo169	(defendant).	The	case	was	opened	for	adjudication	on	December	12,	2010	in	the	Land	





concrete	 blocks,	 commonly	 erected	 as	 a	 sign	 of	 land	 ownership,	 on	 property	 owned	 by	 the	
plaintiff.	When	the	plaintiff	asked	the	defendants	why	they	did	so,	the	defendant	said	that	the	
land	was	purchased	from	them	below	the	market	price.	The	lawyer	argued	that	the	defendant	
sold	 the	 land	 to	 the	plaintiff,	and	her	 son	was	a	witness	 in	 the	notary.	The	 lawyer	 therefore	
requested	the	court	to	rule	the	land	belonged	to	his	client	and	order	the	defendant	to	pay	legal	
expenses.		
In	his	 counterargument,	 the	defendant’s	 lawyer	denied	 these	allegations.	The	 lawyer	argued	
that	his	client	did	not	sell	the	land	to	the	plaintiff	but	there	was	a	verbal	agreement	between	his	
client	 and	 the	 plaintiff.	 The	 agreement	 was	 that	 the	 plaintiff	 should	 help	 the	 defendant’s	
daughter	migrate	to	an	overseas	country.	The	plaintiff	was	also	supposed	to	register	the	land	






















needed	 the	 money.	 Considering	 the	 kinship-based	 relations	 between	 the	 two	 families,	 the	











The	second	sitting	was	convened	on	December	26,	2010.	 In	 this	hearing,	 the	Commissioners	
were	taken	to	the	 land	 in	question,	 located	 in	G/Libah,	Warabe	Salan,	Aw	Adan.	The	 lawyers	
showed	the	Commissioners	around	the	property.	The	Commissioners	gave	instruction	for	the	
land	 to	 be	 measured,	 which	 was	 recorded	 as	 250x150m.	 They	 also	 identified	 the	 private	
properties	 and	 public	 spaces	 surrounding	 the	 land.	 The	 plaintiff’s	 lawyer	 also	 showed	 the	
Commissioners	concrete	blocks	with	some	scribbling	on	them,	and	an	earthwork	which	has	since	
been	 levelled.	 He	 argued	 that	 these	 concrete	 blocks	 belong	 to	 the	 plaintiff,	 and	 they	 are	
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The	 second	 witness	 was	 a	 35	 years-old	 builder.	 He	 told	 the	 court	 that	 they	 started	 the	
construction	 of	 the	 concrete	 blocks	 in	 the	 morning.	 At	 the	 time,	 there	 was	 no	 sign	 of	 the	


























They	pointed	out	 that,	 in	 line	with	Article	79	and	80	of	XHM,	the	Commission	compared	the	
evidence	presented	by	the	two	sides	in	the	form	of	witnesses	and	documents.	This	is	so	despite	
the	 fact	 the	only	written	document	 submitted	 to	 the	court	was	 the	notary	 sale’s	agreement	
disputed	by	the	defendants.	 	This	makes	the	witnesses	the	only	significant	evidence	for	both	
sides	 of	 the	 land	 dispute.	 In	 the	 ruling,	 the	 Commissioners	 also	 claim	 that	 upon	 a	 close	
examination	of	the	testimonials,	they	were	satisfied	with	the	accounts	provided	by	the	plaintiffs’	
four	witnesses.		





the	 sides	 and	 the	 defendant’s	 children	 were	 on	 site	 at	 the	 time	 of	 the	 construction.	 The	
Commission	was	satisfied	with	these	testimonies.	
The	 defendant’s	 witnesses	 were	 two.	 The	 first	 witness	 testified	 that	 he	 accompanied	 the	
defendant	and	the	plaintiff	to	the	farm	at	the	time	of	the	exchange.	He	testified	that	he	was	also	
aware	of	the	payment,	and	he	was	a	signatory	in	the	notary.	The	only	difference	he	pointed	out	
was	 that	 the	 land	 was	 a	 gift	 and	 not	 sale.	 His	 testimony	 therefore	 does	 not	 support	 the	






















I	 have	 detailed	 this	 case	 at	 length	 because	 it	 shows	 the	 absence	 of	 proper	 documentation,	






major	 problem	 with	 the	 reliance	 on	 witness	 accounts	 relates	 to	 their	 authenticity.	 Sources	
knowledgeable	about	the	land	disputes	in	the	city	informed	me	of	the	existence	of	a	group	of	
people	who	are	commonly	known	as	dheer	beenaalayaal,	which	can	be	 loosely	translated	as	




Commissioners	 have	 overlooked	 the	 possibility	 of	 verifying	 disputant	 claims	 from	 the	 police	
records.	 In	 other	words,	 the	 police	 could	 have	 been	 requested	 to	 check	whether	 they	 sent	
officers	 to	 the	construction	site	as	claimed	by	one	of	 the	disputants.	Such	poor	coordination	
between	the	various	agencies	involved	in	land	conflicts	makes	adjudication	processes	weak	but	
also	compromises	revelation	of	the	truth.		







how	 they	 relate	 to	 the	 case.	 This	 ambiguity	 in	 the	 application	 of	 the	 law	 discourages	many	
people	from	using	the	statutory	system	as	they	are	confused	by	the	complex	legal	organisation	
whose	details	are	buried	deep	in	books	that	are	barely	accessible	or	available	to	the	vast	majority	
of	people	 in	 the	city.	The	way	 this	case	was	handled	echoes	 issues	 raised	 in	 focus	groups,171	
which	 support	 my	 interpretation	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 trust	 in	 the	 Commission’s	 process	 and	
















when	 a	 warrant	 reaches	 the	 station	 commander,	 he	 communicates	 the	
divisional	commander	and	then	the	divisional	commander	communicates	the	
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Minister	 and	 then	 the	 decision	 comes	 from	 the	 Minister	 saying	 that	
enforcement	of	court	sentence	could	cause	greater	political	repercussion	and	
therefore	there	is	no	need	to	enforce	it.173	
As	 evident	 here,	 the	 key	 challenge	 facing	 the	 Land	 Commission	 is	 a	 lack	 of	 enforcement.	
Similarly,	 clan	 mobilisation	 makes	 it	 difficult	 politically	 for	 the	 state	 to	 take	 action	 against	
individuals.	Some	of	the	reasons	that	make	clans	render	support	their	kinsmen	is	that	many	of	
the	judgments	are	perceived	to	have	been	issued	through	corruption	or	nepotism.	But	it	is	also	
















Aside	 from	 the	 fears	 of	 the	 destabilising	 repercussions	 resulting	 from	
enforcement,	security	forces	exercise	extreme	caution	in	enforcements	due	











is	 lesser	 than	 the	 standard	 clan-based	 arrangements	 and	 this	 leads	 to	
unacceptability	of	government	compensation.176	
Enforcement	 is	 also	 weakened	 by	 the	 mutual	 exploitation	 of	 government	 and	 traditional	
institutions/Akils.	 In	other	words,	 the	government	exploits	 the	 traditional	 system	 in	order	 to	
enforce	 its	 rules	 and	 regulations	 and	 the	 traditional	 authorities	 exploit	 the	 government	









boss	that	he	 is	under	court	 instruction	to	arrest	 the	man	and	bring	him	to	
court	but	was	challenged	that	he	will	be	responsible	for	any	insecurity	that	
results	 from	this	attempt.	The	 following	day,	a	group	of	Akils	 came	to	me	


































































thesis,	 that	 the	way	 the	 Land	 Commission	 and	 other	 legal	 institutions	 operates	 is	 thus	 also	
implicated	 in	 the	perpetuation	of	 territorial	 segregation.	 This	 is	because	 the	way	urban	 land	
conflicts	are	managed	to	a	significant	degree	can	change	or	reinforce	the	spatial	character	of	the	
city.	For	instance,	if	the	constitution	of	a	specialised	Commission	for	land	conflicts	succeeded	in	


















































In	 2012,	 the	 government	 of	 Somaliland	 embarked	 on	 efforts	 aimed	 at	 expanding	 Egal	
International	 Airport	 in	 Hargeisa,	 following	 an	 infrastructural	 development	 grant	 from	 the	
Kingdom	of	Kuwait.	The	proposed	expansion	included	the	construction	of	a	runway	as	well	as	





the	 state	 threatened	 land	 owners	 with	 eviction	 and	 land	 owners	 warned	 the	 state	 of	 dire	
consequences.	Evidently,	the	two	sides	were	engaged	in	a	legitimacy	struggle	in	which	each	side	
sought	to	legitimise	its	actions	and	delegitimise	those	of	the	other.	In	this	chapter,	I	argue	that	
this	 legitimacy	 struggle	 marginalises	 the	 poor	 due	 to	 unequal	 power	 relations,	 undermines	
public	trust	in	the	state,	and	forms	the	basis	on	which	violent	resistance	is	justified.	Insecurity	








This	 chapter	 relies	 on	 key	 informal	 interviews,	 archival	materials,	 and	media	 sources.	While	
discussions	on	the	concept	of	hybridity	make	references	to	the	dynamics	of	state	legitimacy	and	
the	essential	single	nature	of	legitimation	through	the	fusion	of	state	and	customary	institutions,	
the	 spatial	 manifestation	 is	 neglected.	 Simply	 casting	 institutions	 that	 shape	 the	 spatial	
character	of	 the	 cities	 in	 Somaliland	 as	hybrid,	 thus	works	 to	obscure	 rather	 than	 illuminate	
important	social	and	political	processes.	The	chapter	is	organised	into	five	sections.	In	the	first	
																																								 																				
180	 The	northern	direction	 is	 exempted	 from	 the	 expansion	due	 to	 the	 existence	of	 substantial	 urban	
development	consisting	of	both	commercial	and	residential	areas.	






fourth	 and	 fifth	 sections,	 I	 discuss	 how	 the	 state	 rationalises	 and	 seeks	 to	 implement	 land	






limited	 available	 literature	 on	 legitimacy	 places	 the	 focus	 on	 the	 national	 and	 regional	
subnational	levels	overlooking	the	local	and	more	specifically	the	urban	(Pegg	and	Kolstø,	2015,	
Richards,	 2015,	 Wiuff	 Moe,	 2011).	 Hoffman	 and	 Kirk	 (2013)	 underline	 the	 importance	 of	
localising	legitimacy	debates	as	they	are	shaped	by	the	everyday	interaction	between	people,	
influenced	 by	 cultures	 and	 beliefs.	 Moreover,	 legitimacy	 discussions	 at	 the	 local	 level	 are	
important	for	understanding	the	rationales	through	which	people	may	assess	legitimacy,	which	
is	largely	shaped	by	the	meaning	citizens	attach	to	state	behaviour	(Gupta	and	Sharma,	2006).	
According	 to	 Nora	 and	 Réginas	 (2014)	 differentials	 in	 how	 people	 may	 rate	 legitimacy	 and	
ascribe	different	 levels	to	various	 institutions	within	a	state,181	can	be	accounted	for	through	
examination	of	 the	 local.	Thus,	examining	the	 localised	conflict	over	 the	airport	expansion	 in	
Hargeisa,	will	enable	us	to	understand	more	closely	the	political,	economic	and	social	factors	
underpinning	the	various	ways	in	which	perceptions	towards	the	state	legitimacy	are	formed.182		
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Saqafale.	The	settlement	grew	 incrementally	as	other	nomadic	 families	 joined	the	previously	
small	band	of	settlers.186	Infrastructural	development	in	the	area	begun	in	the	early	1950s	at	a	
time	when	the	colonial	government	was	preparing	the	country	for	possible	attainment	of	self-
rule	 or	 full	 independence	 subject	 to	 the	 then	 ongoing	 local,	 regional	 and	 global	 political	
dynamics.	 Among	 the	 most	 significant	 of	 these	 developments	 was	 the	 construction	 of	 the	
airport	in	1952.		Prior	to	this,	the	colonial	government	constructed	a	semi-tarmac	road	on	the	
Southern	side	of	the	airport	in	1951.187	For	the	first	few	years,	airport	activities	remained	limited	




1956/7	 budget.	 Despite	 conflicting	 advice	 on	 the	 issue	 between	 the	 various	 departments	
concerned	 (Treasury,	 1958),	 the	 treasury	 approved	 a	 grant	 of	 14,180	 to	 finance	 95%	 of	 the	
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so	 this	 probably	 compromised	 any	 greater	 resistance	 to	 the	 expansion	 at	 that	 time.	
Furthermore,	 the	Governor	of	 the	 then	North-Western	Province	 for	which	Hargeisa	was	 the	
capital	refurbished	the	airport	facilities	and	added	resting	rooms	in	the	early	1970s.189	
Aside	from	the	fact	that	the	airport	was,	and	still	is,	a	valuable	transport	hub	in	the	country,	it	
was	also,	and	remains	a	strategically	 important	 focal	point	 for	state	 legitimacy.	For	 instance,	
during	the	conflict	between	Ethiopia	and	Somalia	in	the	late	1970s	and	early	1980s,	the	city	of	
Hargeisa	was	vulnerable	to	Ethiopian	airpower	due	to	its	close	proximity	to	the	border.	As	the	
airport	 is	 located	on	higher	ground	than	most	parts	of	 the	city,	 it	 served	as	one	of	 the	most	
important	strategic	places	where	air	defence	systems	aimed	at	preventing	Ethiopian	jetfighters	
from	 bombarding	 the	 city	 could	 be	 installed.	 As	 a	 result,	 the	 Somali	 government	 placed	 a	
significant	arsenal	 in	and	around	 the	airport.	 The	airport	also	became	a	 strategic	ground	 for	
political	control	and	power.	This	strategic	role	became	more	apparent	during	the	civil	war	 in	












the	 President	 faced	 during	 his	 time	 in	 office	 came	 from	 militias	 based	 in	 the	 airport.	 This	
resistance	 finally	 resulted	 in	a	 stalemate	emanating	 from	 the	President’s	 attempt	 to	 forcibly	
demobilise	 the	militias	 and	gaining	 control	 over	 the	 airport	 not	only	because	of	 its	 strategic	
transportation	vitality	but	also	for	its	 importance	in	strengthening	state	control	over	the	city.	
Militias	in	the	airport	who	were	unconvinced	about	the	legitimacy	of	the	President’s	ascent	to	














Territorial	 and	 state-owned	 property	 control	 was	 an	 essential	 element	 of	 state	 building	 in	





















Hargeisa	 airport	 in	 particular	 continues	 to	 receive	 significant	 attention	 from	 authorities	 in	
Somaliland	 partly	 because	 of	 the	 fact	 that	 traffic	 in	 the	 airport	 has	 seen	 significant	 growth,	
generating	a	greater	 level	of	 revenues	 for	 the	 state.192	 For	 instance,	 flights	 from/to	Hargeisa	
have	increased	from	1422	to	2581	between	2006	to	2007,	a	sharp	rise	of	82%193	(See	table	1).		
Correspondingly,	both	the	cargo	and	passengers	in	the	airport	have	increased.		For	example,	in	
2006,	 the	number	of	 incoming	passengers	stood	at	34566	while	 the	number	of	 the	outgoing	
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alone,	 but	 attention	 has	 to	 be	 also	 directed	 at	 quality	 of	 services	 where	 airports	 take	
environmental	aspects	of	development195	and	performance	into	account.	Equally,	community	
relations	 with	 the	 airport	 is	 also	 vital.	 In	 other	 words,	 while	 conforming	 to	 international	
standards	and	passenger	rating	are	crucial	for	appraisal	of	airport	performance	and	image,	what	
is	equally	important	is	how	communities	see	and	feel	about	airports	within	their	vicinities.	This	
is	 because	 community	 life	 is	 affected	 and	 shaped	 by	 airport	 operations.	 In	 addition	 to	 the	
economic	dimensions	of	the	airport	(MCAAT,	2012	)	cited	in	(Gandrup,	2014),	the	current	focus	
of	 airport	 development	 in	 Somaliland	 is	 primarily	 targeted	 at	 the	 legitimisation	 of	 de	 facto	
statehood	 in	an	environment	where	 	de	 jure	 status	 is	denied.	Similarly,	 the	airport,	as	a	key	
revenue	generating	facility,	also	serves	as	a	site	of	 interaction	for	state	viability,	visibility	and	
legitimacy.		





instance,	 post-conflict	 leaders	 use	 land	 as	 a	 way	 of	 legitimising	 their	 rule	 by	 promising	 to	
implement	comprehensive	 reforms	aimed	at	 redressing	past	 injustice.	This	 is	particularly	 the	
case	in	situations	where	the	institutions	of	the	ousted	regime	suffered	from	a	crisis	of	legitimacy	






short	 period	 operated	 on	 power	 provided	 through	 renewable	 energy	 project	 but	 the	 facilities	 were	
paralyzed	by	lack	of	maintenance	(Somalilandgov,	2013).	







The	 state’s	 inability	 to	 deal	 effectively	 with	 these	 problems,	 for	 almost	 six	 years	 following	
Somaliland’s	unilateral	declaration	of	independence	from	the	rest	of	Somalia	in	1991,	led	to	loss	
of	 trust	 in	 the	new	order.	The	 termination	of	 the	war	 in	1997	however	enabled	 the	state	 to	
initiate	 efforts	 aimed	 at	 improving	 its	 image	 and	 control	 over	 state	 territories.	 This	 exercise	
began	with	installation	of	the	first	post-conflict	basic	fence	around	the	airport,	along	the	lines	
inherited	from	the	military	regime.	This	was	followed	by	several	renovations	aimed	at	enhancing	
the	 airport’s	 capacity	 for	 handling	 increased	 numbers	 of	 travellers	 at	 a	 time	when	 diaspora	
communities	from	the	region	were	significantly	increasing	connections	with	their	homeland	due	
to	 sustained	 peace	 and	 stability.	Most	 of	 the	 airlines	 using	 the	 airport	 were	 Somali	 owned	
companies	who	made	regular	flights	to	the	Middle	East	where	travellers	could	transit	mostly	to	
international	 connections	 to	 North	 America	 and	 Western	 Europe.	 More	 recently,	 the	






is	 struggling	with	 the	burden	of	non-recognition,	 to	have	access	 to	 international	connections	




ensure	 that	 carriers	 operate	 in	 a	 safe	 and	 acceptable	 operational	 environment,	 aviation	
authorities	have	to	comply	with	international	regulations	scattered	over	more	than	19	annexes	
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(ICAO,	 1974),	 various	 manuals	 (ICAO,	 2013b,	 ICAO,	 2013c,	 ICAO,	 2003,	 ICAO,	 2014)	 and	
treaties196	(ICAO,	1944).	
These	treaties,	annexes	and	manuals	provide	recommendations	ranging	from	runway	specific	




Plan	 of	 2014–2016,	 states	 are	 required	 to	 achieve	 “implementation	 of	 an	 effective	 safety	
oversight	system”	by	2017;	full	implementation	of	the	ICAO	State	Safety	Program	framework	by	
2022;	 and	 advanced	 safety	oversight	 system	 including	predictive	 risk	management”	by	 2027	
(ICAO,	2013a,	p.	4).	These	targets	are	set	and	informed	by	a	narrowly	defined	concept	of	safety	
as	a	“state	in	which	the	possibility	of	harm	to	persons	or	of	property	damage	is	reduced	to,	and	
maintained	 at	 or	 below,	 an	 acceptable	 level	 through	 a	 continuing	 process	 of	 hazard	
identification	and	safety	risk	management”	(ICAO,	2013c,	pp.	2-1).	
In	 order	 to	 implement	 this	 narrowly	 defined	 view	 of	 safety,	 states	 are	 required	 to	 develop	
processes	 and	 train	 skilled	 personnel	 for	 their	 implementation.	 At	 the	 heart	 of	 this	 are	 the	
development	 of	 country	 specific	 safety	 guidelines,197	 which	 include	 the	 formulation	 and	
maintenance	 of	 State	 Safety	 Programs	 (SSP)	 (ICAO,	 2013c).	 This	 entails	 the	 preparation	 and	
enactment	of	rules	and	regulations	aimed	at	ensuring	efficient	and	effective	delivery	of	aviation	
services	which	include	the	development	of	Visual	and	Instrument	of	Flight	Procedures	(VIFP)	for	
the	 navigation	 of	 aircraft	 as	well	 as	 the	 provision	 of	 other	 equipment	 deemed	 essential	 for	
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populations	 affected	 by	 the	 conformance	 related	 exercises.198	 In	 the	 case	 of	 Somaliland,	 a	
significant	 proportion	 of	 this	 conformance	 is	 managed	 by	 the	 ICAO	 office	 in	 Nairobi,	 Civil	
Aviation	Caretaker	Authority	 for	 Somalia	 (CACAS),	partly	because	of	 the	 lack	of	 capacity	and	
partly	 because	 of	 disagreement	 between	 Somaliland	 and	 Somalia	 regarding	 the	 control	 of	
airspace	(ICAO,	2013b).		
Informed	 by	 the	 aforementioned	 requirements,	most	 international	 airlines	 tend	 to	 evaluate	
airports	before	they	start	operations.	Various	teams	are	dispatched	to	assess	the	situation	on	










recommended	 standards	 such	 as	 the	 creation	 of	 a	 secure	 fence	 and	 boundaries	 are	 still	
underway.	Of	particular	safety	concern	for	authorities	are	“freely	roaming	animals”,	which	pose	
a	 danger	 to	 the	 operation	 of	 aircrafts	 in	 the	 airport.	 According	 to	 the	Ministry	 of	 National	
Planning	 and	 Development,	 lack	 of	 “navigational	 aids	 and	 proper	 airfield	 lighting	 facilities”	
hamper	the	ability	of	the	airport	to	handle	airlines	during	low	visibility	conditions	such	as	rainy	
and	non-daylight	times	(MNPD,	2012,	pp.	123-4).	In	addition	to	these	infrastructural	deficits,	the	
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As	 can	 be	 seen	 here,	 these	 priorities	 are	 designed	 to	 enable	 the	 state	 to	 conform	 to	 the	






















this	 task	 (Somaliland	 Post,	 2015).	 These	 included	 the	Ministers	 of	 Aviation,	 Defence,	 Public	
Works,	 Interior,	 Presidency,	 and	 Health	 as	 well	 as	 the	 Director	 General	 of	 the	 Ministry	 of	
















issue	 of	 demarcation,	 we	 told	 them	 that	 the	 airport	 boundary	 has	 been	
demarcated	 three	 times	 before	 by	 various	 administrations	 including	 the	
colonial,	post-colonial	 Somali	administration	and	post-conflict	government	
under	the	leadership	of	Egal.	We	cannot	continue	losing	our	land	all	the	time	
because	 of	 policies	 introduced	 by	 every	 new	 regime	 in	 the	 name	 of	
development.203	
According	to	Munene	(2012),	development	projects	serve	as	a	means	through	which	state	image	
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felt	 compelled	 to	 divulge	 some	 of	 the	 specifics	 of	 such	 benefits.	 According	 to	 one	 of	 the	
attendees	in	the	meeting,	the	state	officials	pointed	out	that	some	of	the	land	in	question:		
would	 be	 used	 for	 the	 construction	 of	 major	 hotels	 and	 other	 executive	
housing	 schemes	 which	 will	 boost	 the	 image	 of	 the	 city	 and	 provide	
dignitaries	and	other	 important	guests	a	secure	environment	within	which	
they	could	undertake	their	dealings	in	Somaliland.205	
Nonetheless,	 most	 of	 those	 in	 the	meeting	 remained	 unconvinced	 about	 the	 government’s	
claims.	The	government	attempted	from	the	beginning	to	involve	traditional	leaders.	According	








traditional	authorities	emerge	with	 increased	 legitimacy.	Regardless	of	whether	 legitimacy	of	
customary	institutions	is	reduced	or	not,	non-state	actors’	cooperation	with	the	state	is	vital	for	
voluntary	compliance	with	rules	and	regulations	in	a	context	of	fragility.	In	the	case	of	the	airport	
expansion,	 such	 cooperation	 is	 however	 unlikely	 to	 produce	 voluntary	 compliance	 as	 the	

































land).	 It	 involved	designating	30	percent	of	the	planned	land	for	public	purposes,	 in	 line	with	
urban	development	guidelines.	Despite	conforming	to	these	rules	and	obtaining	the	necessary	
papers	for	turning	this	land	into	residential	settlements,	some	of	the	land-owners	are	furious	
with	 the	 prospect	 of	 facing	 eviction.	 Moreover,	 multiple	 institutions	 are	 involved	 in	 the	
proposed	land	expropriation,	confusing	the	mainly	illiterate	land	owners.	On	the	one	hand	the	


















in	which	on	 the	one	hand	 they	engaged	 in	a	dialogue	with	 land	owners,	acknowledged	 local	
people’s	 land	 ownership	 and	 sought	 a	 negotiated	 settlement.	 On	 the	 other	 hand,	 they	 also	
threatened	 land	 owners	 with	 forceful	 eviction	 and	 threw	 doubt	 on	 the	 legitimacy	 of	 local	
people’s	land	ownership	by	saying	that	the	government	has	the	right	to	use	public	land	for	public	










people	 [land	 owners]	 have	 always	 been	 a	 protection	 for	 the	 airport	 from	
1997.	 They	 guaranteed	 the	 security	 of	 the	 airport	 and	 therefore	 security	







176	|	P a g e 	
	
	
While	 land-owners	 complain	 about	 the	 government’s	 lack	 of	 sensitivity	 to	 the	 role	 the	 local	













used	 to	 use	 for	 accessing	 the	 city	 are	 now	 closed	 and	 alternative	 routes	 have	 not	 been	








area.	 Discussions	 were	 also	 underway,	 according	 to	 airport	 officials	 at	 the	 time	 of	 data	
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These	promises	 are	mostly	 disregarded	by	 the	predominantly	 Eidagale	 residents	 in	Uubaale,	
who	see	the	state	as	uncaring	and	unsympathetic,	which	only	takes	from	the	citizens	but	doesn’t	
give	back.	This	view	is	partly	created	by	the	government’s	traditional	poor	service	delivery	in	the	
area	but	was	more	 recently	 activated	by	 the	anticipated	 land	expropriation	process	 that	 fell	
short	 of	 people’s	 expectation	 from	 the	 post-Barre	 administrations.	 According	 to	 Nora	 and	
Réginas	(2014,	p.	23),	perception	of	“state	legitimacy	depends	on	the	degree	to	which	specific	
societal	expectations	are	perceived	as	being	met	by	a	specific	state	institution	in	the	eyes	of	a	
specific	 group	 of	 people	 in	 the	 context	 of	 a	 specific	 process	 in	 comparison	 with	 specific	
alternatives”.	Such	particularities	of	experiences	and	how	these	shape	people’s	perception	of	
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be	 told	 that	we	are	wrong.	 So	 in	many	cases,	 these	 third	party	mediators	
were	able	to	confront	the	land	owners	and	tell	the	truth.	They	were	also	able	
to	reach	us	with	complaints	from	the	land	owners.222	
The	 legitimacy	of	 the	 third-party	mediation	was	however	undermined	by	suspicions	 that	 the	
state	was	using	 them	 instrumentally	 (or	 indeed	of	 setting	 them	up	as	 tools)	with	 the	aim	of	
smoothening	the	stance	taken	by	 land-owners.	For	 instance,	the	government	was	accused	of	
financing	the	Committee	for	the	Resolution	of	the	Airport	Conflict	whose	existence	land-owners	
became	 aware	 of,	 after	 members	 of	 another	 neighbourhood	 development	 committee	 they	
contacted	 to	mediate	 informed	 them	that	 the	government	was	unwilling	 to	meet	 them	as	 it	
endorsed	 another	 committee	 for	 the	 mediation	 process.223	 At	 one	 point,	 members	 of	 this	














have	 not	 been	 fair	 from	 the	 beginning.	 They	 were	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	
government.	 Usually	 Akils	 should	 be	 on	 the	 side	 of	 the	 people	 not	 the	
government	and	we	cannot	accept	their	mediation.224	













the	 formation	 of	 the	 Land	 Owners	 Committee.	 As	 the	 government	 did	 not	 have	 an	 easily	
searchable	record	of	land	ownership	in	the	areas,	the	land	owners’	committee	helped	it	enlist	
the	list	of	claimants/owners.	
As	 the	 current	 formal	 judicial	 landscape	 in	 the	 country	 is	 ill	 equipped	 to	 deal	with	 disputes	
between	the	government	and	the	public,	the	newly	formed	Land	Owners	Committee	realised	
that	very	 limited	formal	options	exist	 if	any	for	the	 land-owners	to	complain	about	or	 legally	
resist	 the	 state’s	 intention	 to	 expropriate	 their	 land.	 As	 a	 result,	 they	 considered	 various	
																																								 																				
224	Interviewee	51	March	30,	2014.	Land	Owner.	
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mechanisms	 to	 mitigate	 the	 expropriation	 threats	 including	 both	 customary	 and	 statutory	
adjudication	systems.	But	one	of	the	key	obstacles	to	accessing	state	institutions	was	that	they	
were	unable	to	affords	the	lawyers’	fees.	According	to	one	of	the	committee	members,	they:		
were	 unable	 to	 access	 state	 institutions…only	 those	 who	 have	 influence	
among	the	society	are	welcomed	in	government	offices.	It	is	difficult	for	us	to	
meet	government	officials.	State	courts	are	corrupt	and	we	do	not	believe	






















intention	 to	 buy	 the	 land	 at	 current	market	 values.	 The	Minister	made	 such	 remarks	 in	 the	
																																								 																				
225	Interviewee	42	April	15,	2014.	Lawyer	-	Farmer's	Son.	




that	 they	 will	 process	 payment	 for	 the	 land-owners	 who	 are	 affected	 by	 the	 initial	 400m	
expansion	while	 those	affected	by	 the	1200m	expansion	will	have	 their	 claims	 recorded	and	
negotiations	 about	 possible	 solution	 will	 commence	 soon.226	 For	 the	 land-owners	 this	 was	
welcome	but	while	awaiting	further	details	on	the	specifics	of	this	proposal,	the	Minister	made	
provocative	 remarks	 in	 the	 media,	 accusing	 Eidagale	 clan	 members	 of	 undermining	 the	
government’s	effort	to	expand	the	airport,	a	charge	that	infuriated	the	Uubaale	residents	and	
prompted	doubts	over	the	seriousness	of	the	state	about	the	resolution	of	the	issues	amicably.	
Many	 felt	 this	was	 a	U-turn	 in	 the	 government’s	 position	 in	 the	 land	 conflict,	which	 greatly	
undermined	their	trust	in	the	government.	
Lack	 of	 financial	 resources	 for	 adequate	 legal	 representation	 is	 also	 one	 of	 the	 other	major	
obstacles	that	inhibit	land-owners	from	using	the	formal	judicial	system.	This	makes	customary	
institutions	 the	 most	 crucial	 avenue	 of	 mediation	 available	 to	 land	 owners.	 It	 is	 however	
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on	 the	basis	of	 investment	 size.230	 The	government’s	position	was	 reinforced	 in	a	 statement	
made	by	a	Sultan	speaking	on	behalf	of	land-owners	who	tried	to	bargain	with	it,	saying	they	
will	 give	 away	 land	 within	 the	 400m	 radius	 if	 the	 government	 comes	 up	 with	 reasonable	
compensation	 plan	 for	 the	 1200m	 radius.	 Land-owners	 however	 rejected	 this	 proposition,	
lambasting	the	Sultan	for	making	decisions	without	consulting	those	who	would	be	negatively	
affected	and	demanding	that	they	should	be	given	a	full	compensation,	the	absence	of	which	
will	 result	 in	 a	major	 conflict	with	 the	 government.	 Equally	 the	 land-owners	 rejected	partial	
compensation	proposed	in	the	earlier	discussions,	saying	that:	
what	the	government	is	proposing	is	that	they	will	compensate	any	structure	





hence	 they	 do	 not	 qualify	 for	 full	 compensation.	While	 resistance	 to	 this	 position	 remained	
strong,	 land	 owners	 have	 also	 shown	 willingness	 to	 accept	 what	 they	 called	 a	 multi-level	
compensation	strategy	in	which	the	government	firstly	compensates	or	swaps	land	with	similar	
























close	 to	 government	officials	 involved	 in	 the	process	 pointed	out	 that	 compensation	will	 be	
provided	 in	 a	 50/50	 ratio	 of	 monetary	 and	 land	 exchange.234	 In	 2014,	 the	 government	




process	 designed	 and	 led	 by	 government	 institutions	 without	 the	 involvement	 of	 the	 land-























In	spite	of	assurances	 that	 land-owners	have	the	choice	of	consulting	private	evaluators,	 the	










who	do	not	meet	 the	government	benchmark	 for	expertise.	Moreover,	many	people	 cannot	
afford	this	expertise.	So	far,	the	authorities	announced	that	they	compensated	for	about	90%	of	











800,000	m²,	was	 documented	 and	 copies	were	 sent	 to	 the	 relevant	ministries	 and	 the	 local	
council	respectively	(Somaliland	Post,	2015).	The	source	of	the	money	for	this	compensation	is	
contested.	While	 the	 government	 officials	 claim	 that	 the	 treasury	 provided	 the	 funds,	 land-
owners	 charge	 that	 the	Ministry	 of	Aviation	was	provided	with	 funds	 by	 the	 government	 of	
Kuwait	 for	 not	 only	 the	 construction	 but	 also	 for	 the	 compensation	 of	 the	 land	 to	 be	
expropriated	for	the	expansion.	The	Director	General	of	the	Ministry	of	Aviation,	Omar	Sayid	
Abdullahi	Adam,	categorically	denied	this,	saying	that	Kuwait	donated	$10m	for	Hargeisa	and	
Bebera	airports	but	 this	was	only	 for	 the	construction	of	 the	 fences	and	runways	 (Togaherer	
News,	2015).		
Those	who	fail	to	agree	to	the	government	compensation	or	refuse	to	sell	their	land	are	faced	









care	 about	 whether	 the	 government	 expropriated	 land	 from	 them	 as	 it	 was	 increasingly	
becoming	apparent	that	the	regime’s	time	was	over.	They	claim	that	they	always	knew	that	the	
regime	will	be	toppled	and	people	will	get	their	land	back.238		
As	evident	above,	 the	attempt	 to	 resort	 to	 force	by	a	 supposedly	democratic	administration	
forms	 the	 basis	 on	 which	 post-conflict	 urban	 governance	 practices	 are	 delegitimised.	 For	
instance,	 forceful	 eviction	 is	 believed	 to	 be	 tantamount	 to	 authoritarianism	 akin	 to	 that	
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able	 to	 implement	 its	 policies	 and	 practices	 to	 the	 book,	 amid	 divided	 perception	 of	 the	
legitimacy	of	such	actions	among	the	populace.	On	the	other	hand,	this	period	is	associated	with	
suppression	and	absence	of	dialogue	between	citizens	and	the	government	as	the	state	often	
employed	 repressive	means	 to	 subdue	 any	 resistance	 to	 its	 policies	 or	 politics.	 The	 current	
state’s	 determination	 to	 show	 its	 capacity	 for	 implementing	 decisions	 and	 the	 people’s	
determination	 to	 resist	 such	 moves,	 makes	 violent	 confrontation	 almost	 imminent.	 In	 one	





the	 Ministry	 to’	 seek	 their	 rights	 from	 the	 state’.	 Land-owners	 deny	 the	 existence	 of	 this	
agreement.239	In	another	instance,	serious	violence	almost	erupted	between	land-owners	and	




contradiction	 to	 earlier	 understanding	 that	 the	 government	 will	 not	 take	 unilateral	 action.	

























agree	 with	 him.243	 These	 accusations	 gained	 momentum	 when	 	 reports	 emerged	 about	
disagreement	between	the	military	and	the	Civil	Aviation	Ministry	(Somaliland	Post,	2015).	Even	
though	 the	 main	 points	 of	 their	 contention	 remain	 unrevealed	 officially,	 the	 Ministry	 of	
Aviation’s	intention	to	register	its	complaint	against	the	military	was	reported	in	the	press.	This	




barracks	 to	 other	 parts	 of	 the	 city	 so	 as	 to	make	 the	 land	 exclusively	 airport	 property.	 The	











242	 They	 charge	 that	 the	 airport	 does	 not	 face	 a	 threat	 from	 outside	 the	 country	 and	 hence	military	
presence	in	this	civilian	installation	is	not	necessary.	
243	Interviewee	46	March	30,	2014.	Land	Owner	-	Taxi	driver.	






conflict.	The	ant	 is	a	very	small	 insect	and	you	may	know	how	painful	 it	 is	
when	it	stings,	I	can	assure	you	that	our	fight	is	not	going	to	be	less	stingier.244		




































to	 other	 avenues	 for	 justice	 and	 governance.	 The	 consequence	 is	 that	 state	 institutions	 are	
weakened	 and	 people	 are	 obliged	 to	 make	 “further	 investment	 in	 non-state	 institutions	 as	
potential	channels	of”	service	delivery	(Berry,	2007)	and	protection	against	state	aggression.	The	
geographical	 manifestation	 of	 this	 marginalisation	 of	 the	 poor	 emanating	 partly	 from	 the	
struggle	for	legitimacy	can	partly	explain	the	perpetuation	of	the	clan	based	spatial	segregation	
evident	in	the	city.		
Similarly,	 the	 mediation	 and	 compensation	 processes	 were	 characterised	 by	 a	 legitimation	
struggle	and	mutual	mistrust.	At	the	heart	of	this	struggle	was	the	land-owners’	reluctance	to	















show	 that	 they	 are	 not	 only	 in	 power	 but	 also	 a	 better	 alternative	 to	 those	 they	 deposed.	






shown	 in	 this	 chapter,	 land	 and	 property	 owners	 in	 Hargeisa,	 particularly	 those	 involved	 in	
conflicts,	 seldom	trust	 the	 state.	Evidence	 for	 this	 can	be	 found	 in	 the	 fact	 that	a	 significant	
proportion	of	the	land	conflicts	in	the	city	are	solved	through	personal	negotiations	or	customary	









In	 other	 words,	 individuals	 who	 are	 concerned	 about	 state	 violence	 are	 likely	 to	 maintain	
properties	in	areas	predominantly	populated	by	their	clan	so	as	to	mobilise	the	public	support	
and	 resources	 necessary	 for	 resisting	 against	 the	 state.	 This	 is	 not	 however	 to	 say	 that	
concentration	 of	 clans	 in	 certain	 geographic	 locations	 is	 a	 complete	 deterrent	 against	 state	
aggression.	In	many	instances,	the	state	attempts	to	enforce	decisions	in	area	where	resisting	
clans	made	a	strong	foothold.	Such	attempts	are	however	bloody,	resulting	in	serious	security	
repercussions.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 the	 airport	 expansion,	 attempts	 aimed	 at	 implementing	
government	decisions	may	on	the	one	hand	result	in	people	putting	up	violent	resistance,	which	
can	cause	death	and	destruction	of	properties,	while	on	 the	other,	airport	 security	might	be	




In	 the	 next	 chapter,	 I	 discuss	 the	 breakdown	 of	 security	 that	 can	 result	 from	 the	 limited	
mediation	space	for	urban	land	conflicts	in	which	the	state	is	one	of	the	disputants.		





















































worth	 invoking	 the	 various	 explanations	 for	 the	 persistence	 of	 clan	 loyalty	 for	 reasons	 of	
security.	 	 Lewis	 (2008b)’s	 contention	 that	 both	 violence	 and	 its	 resolution	 mechanism	 are	
inherent	in	Somali	culture	and	therefore	the	state	had	to	accept	the	clan	as	a	reality	through	
which	people’s	social	and	security	needs	are	managed,	is	one	pertinent	view.	Yet	it	is	contested	
by	 Samatar	 and	 Samatar	 (1988,	 1997)	 who	 blame	 a	 dishonest	 elite	 for	 preventing	 the	
advancement	of	civic	governance	where	the	security	agencies	can	earn	the	trust	of	the	people	
and	promote	citizenship	as	opposed	to	clanship.	His	proposition	that	poor	governance	practices	




actors	 and	 dynamics	 of	 urban	 security	 in	 the	 post-conflict	 context.	 Scholars	 have	 invoked	 a	
trajectory	 from	the	heightened	era	of	 clan	protection	 in	 the	 immediate	aftermath	of	Barre’s	
																																								 																				
248	 For	 instance,	 it	 could	 not	make	 sense	 to	 trust	 a	multi	 clan	 police	 force	where	 in	 some	 cases	 the	
perpetrator	could	belong	to	the	same	clan	as	a	member	of	a	police	investigating	a	case	involving	a	victim	
from	another	clan.	





























According	 to	 a	 report	 by	 the	 Danish	 Demining	 Group	 (2009,	 p.	 35),	 some	 of	 the	 [key]	
“characteristics	 of	 the	 internal	 safety	 and	 security	 environment….in	 Somaliland…are	 the	



















































the	 confiscated	 land	 (i.e.	 factory	 that	 fixes	 broken	 weapons,	 firearm	 testing	 facilities,	 and	











civilian	 claimants	 covertly	 advised	 them	 that	 the	 only	 mechanism	 through	 which	 they	 can	
pragmatically	 open	 a	 case	 against	 the	military	 establishment	was	 through	 their	 own	 courts.	
Heeding	this	advice,	they	tried	to	open	a	case	in	the	military	courts	but	the	courts	refused	to	
accept	their	submission.	As	suing	the	army	through	its	subsidiary	organs	did	not	bring	about	any	



























































the	 state	 responded	 heavy-handedly	 to	 the	 incident	 but	 also	 the	 swiftness	 with	 which	 it	
prosecuted	suspects.		For	instance,	disproportionate	level	of	security	personnel	and	machinery	
were	used	to	bring	the	situation	under	control	while	prosecution	was	speedily	put	together	and	
military	court	convened	within	unrealistic	 timeframe	 (in	 the	Somaliland	context)	of	12	hours	
from	the	time	when	the	 incident	 took	place.	On	the	 following	day,	 the	court	passed	a	death	
sentence	to	17	people	while	5	others,	who	were	underage,	were	sentenced	to	life	imprisonment.	







issued	 within	 24	 hours	 without	 proper	 investigation	 to	 the	 root	 causes	 of	 the	 problem.	
Moreover,	the	legality	of	trying	the	case	in	a	military	court	was	also	questioned.	According	to	a	




























military	 court.	 This	 website,	 which	 is	 run	 by	 a	 blogger	 who	 hails	 from	 the	 Eastern	




The	 military	 court	 was	 accused	 of	 human	 rights	 violations	 as	 it	 denied	 the	 suspects	 their	
constitutional	 rights	 for	 fair	 trial	 and	 legal	 representation.	 This	 is	 because	 none	 of	 those	
sentenced	was	defended	or	legally	represented	in	the	court.	Some	of	the	other	problems	with	









sentenced	 to	death	were	underage	boys	whose	age	 ranged	 from	15	 to	17.	The	 irregularities	
apparent	in	the	way	the	case	was	handled	attracted	criticism	from	not	only	within	the	country	




concern	 about	 the	 [manner	 in	 which	 the]	 trial	 of	 these	 civilians	 was	
conducted	 by	 a	 military	 [court]	 in	 contradiction	 of	 both	 applicable	 local	
statutes	and…	[international	laws	and	norms]	….	He	urges[d]	the	immediate	
transfer	of	the	case	to	a	criminal	court	and	encourage[d]	the	authorities	to	
ensure	 that	 fair	 trial	 rights	 are	 respected….	 [finally]	 calling	 for	 a	 full,	























Only	 dictatorial	 regimes	 keep	 a	 heavily	 fortified	 military	 base	 within	 the	
vicinity	[of	a	civilian	residential	area].		
Some	of	the	messages	carried	in	the	diaspora	websites	were	mainly	aimed	at	raising	awareness	











is	 from	 the	 government	 we	 have	 to	 expect	 patience,	 tolerance	 and	 fair	
treatment.	 There	 is	 no	 doubt	 that	 the	 military	 and	 the	 police	 have	 used	
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why	 are	 the	 soldiers	 [who]	 were	 sent	 to	 the	 place	 of	 the	 incident	 were	
selectively	from	a	particular	clan	to	face	a	particular	clan?	Many	people	in	
Hargeisa	believe	that	it	was	deliberately	planned	to	create	a	wedge	between	
the	 brotherly	 communities	 [in	 Hargeisa]	 so	 that	 Siilanyo	 could	 fish	 in	 the	





up	 transportation	 of	 the	 bodies	 of	 their	 military	 men,	 also	 echoing	 out	 clan	 inclined	
inflammatory	remarks	in	the	aftermath	of	the	attack.	The	author	asks,	‘the	question	is	who	the	







and	 making	 the	 matter	 inter-clan	 issue.	 To	 this	 end,	 the	 elders	 used	 their	 network	 in	 the	
customary	institutions	to	bring	about	a	solution	to	this	problem.	They	met	representatives	from	
the	 deceased	 men’s’	 clan.	 The	 point	 of	 departure	 for	 these	 elders	 was	 the	 fact	 that	 the	
assailants’	clan,	Habar	Yonis,	had	no	intention	of	engaging	violently	with	the	Sa’ad	Muse	of	the	

























The	 aforementioned	 efforts	 aimed	 at	 releasing	 the	 jailed	 assailants	 through	 clan-based	
negotiations	were	also	accompanied	by	similar	efforts	aimed	at	convincing	the	state	to	release	
the	 assailants.	 For	 instance,	 six	 people	 including	 three	 Sultans,	 businessman,	 and	 other	 key	
figures	representing	the	clans	in	the	Eastern	side	of	the	city	met	with	the	President	of	Somaliland	
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Amid	weak	 justice	 system,	 violence	 emanating	 from	urban	 land	 conflict	 is	 the	 single	 biggest	
threat	to	security	in	Somaliland	(OCVP,	2012,	OCVP,	2013a,	OCVP,	2013b).	While	the	traditional	
system	is	criticised	for	inability	to	deal	with	land	disputes	in	complex	urban	settings,	they	proved	













a	 violent	 encounter	 and	 undermine	 the	 long-invested	 security	 in	 the	 city.	 This	 may	 in	 turn	
cement	the	spatial	segregation	in	the	city	as	people	will	see	it	beneficial	to	stay	in	areas	where	
they	could	resist	the	state	more	easily	or	escape	conflict	(Bryden,	1994a).268	The	authorities	have	
in	 many	 cases	 expressed	 concerns	 about	 the	 challenges	 presented	 by	 the	 concentration	 of	
groups	in	specific	geographical	locations	to	law	enforcement.	The	high	rate	of	unemployment	
among	the	youth	and	the	exploitation	of	clan	identity	can	fuel	insecurity	in	the	city.		Risk	factors	

































This	 thesis	 is	 the	 first	 analysis	 of	 the	 shaping	of	 city	 space	 in	 Somaliland.	 	 I	 highlighted	how	
current	debates	on	Somaliland	examine	mainly	national	 level	politics	and	governance.	 I	have	
therefore,	 suggested	a	 shift	 in	 focus	 to	 the	neglected	 city	 space	and	authority,	where	urban	
subjects/citizens	encounter	the	local	state	on	a	daily	basis,	and	where	the	manifestation	of	lack	
of	trust	has	repeatedly	fostered	a	trend	towards	spatial	segregation.	The	thesis	shows	that	an	















reconfiguration,	 I	 examined	 urban	 governance	 in	 Hargeisa	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 explaining	 how	
segregation	has	developed	over	time.	I	approached	this	analysis	historically	and	advocated	an	
urban	ethnographic	approach	(chapter	three).		The	study’s	empirical	discussion	began	with	an	
examination	of	the	history	of	municipal	governance/politics	 (chapter	4).	 I	 then	zoomed	in	on	
particular	aspects	of	urban	governance	 such	as	 land	administration	and	conflict	 adjudication	
mechanisms	(chapters	five	and	six).	I	finally	examined	specific	land	conflicts	–	around	Hargeisa	
airport	 and	 military	 base	 -	 to	 show	 how	 the	 interaction	 between	 the	 state	 and	 the	 public	
undermines	trust	and	fosters	urban	segregation	(chapters	seven	and	eight).		
The	overall	thesis	was	guided	by	the	question:	what	are	the	key	historical	processes	and	recent	
socio-political	 dynamics	 underpinning	 Hargeisa’s	 spatial	 character	 as	 clan-based	 segregated	
urban	space?	I	answered	this	question	by	arguing	that	urban	governance	was,	and	still	remains,	
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people	 choose	 spaces	 in	 the	 city.	 For	 instance,	 the	use	of	 kinship	 as	 a	means	of	negotiating	
access	to	services	and	support	shows	how	governance	practices	intersect	with	social	dynamics	








perpetuation	of	 urban	 segregation.	 I	 discussed	 the	 introduction	of	 local	 governance	and	 the	
urban	 development	 trajectory	 in	 Hargeisa	 over	 time	 (chapter	 four).	 I	 argued	 that	 urban	
segregation	in	the	city	is	the	spatial	outcome	of	the	antagonistic	interaction	between	ruler	and	
ruled	 over	 time:	 an	 interaction	 whose	 foundation	 was	 laid	 during	 the	 colonial	 period	 and	
reinforced	 thereafter.	 In	 other	 words,	 regimes	 in	 Somalia	 continued	 the	 centralised	
authoritarian	 urban	 governance	 practices	 inherited	 from	 the	 colonial	 administrations.	 I	
therefore	argued	that	segregation	can	be	attributed	initially	to	the	colonial	state’s	centralised	
top	down	and	repressive	urban	governance,	and	thereafter	to	the	postcolonial	state’s	failure	to	







response	 to	 political,	 economic	 and	 security	 problems	 in	 the	 city,	 persisting	 because	 of	 the	
state’s	 incompetence	 in	managing	public	services.	 In	 the	 few	 instance	where	the	state	made	
concerted	efforts	in	improving	access	to	services	on	a	national	basis,	cosmopolitan	spaces	have	
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argued	 that	 land	management	practices	 in	Somaliland	were	often	underpinned	by	 top-down	
processes	 in	both	colonial	and	postcolonial	periods.	For	 instance,	 the	colonial	administrators	
had	rarely	consulted	the	people	nor	the	intermediary	customary	institutions	about	urban	land	




few	attempts	 aimed	at	 bringing	 about	 land	 reforms	 failed.	 The	policy	making	processes	 and	
practices	remain	largely	imposed	from	above.	For	instance,	both	the	National	Urban	Planning	
Board	and	the	National	Urban	Planning	Institute	operate	above	the	local.	The	highly	centralised	
nature	 of	 policy	 making	 instruments	 make	 local	 authorities	 junior	 partners.	 This	 top-down	
process	 and	 the	 inability	of	 the	 state	 to	 consult	 people	 about	 their	urban	destiny	 shape	 the	
persistently	 negative	 attitudes	 towards	 the	 state.	 Thus,	 urban	 segregation	 is	 the	 spatial	
manifestation	of	the	dwindling	trust	in	the	state.	The	continuation	of	the	spatial	segregation	of	





• What	 are	 the	 drivers	 and	 dynamics	 of	 urban	 land	 accessibility,	 conflicts	 and	
adjudication	and	how	do	they	relate	to	trust/	mistrust	of	the	state	and	the	city’s	
pattern	of	segregation?	
To	answer	this,	 I	showed	that	the	urban	 land	conflicts	 in	Somaliland	are	adjudicated	through	
plural	institutions	-	statutory,	traditional	and	to	a	lesser	extent	Islamic	institutions	(chapter	six).	
The	multiplicity	of	actors	involved	in	conflict	resolution	is	however	characterised	by	competition,	







the	 traditional	 authorities	 fill	 the	 gap	 in	 the	 state’s	 inability	 to	 deal	 with	 conflict.	 In	 other	

























The	 city’s	 inhabitants’	 resort	 to	 clan	 and	 greater	 confidence	 in	 customary	 institutions,	 the	
efficacy	of	the	latter	in	some	instances	of	conflict	resolution,	and	the	prominent	role	of	Akils	and	
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over	 land	at	 the	airport	and	military	base	 (chapter	 seven	and	eight).	On	 the	one	hand,	 such	
properties	are	the	sites	in	which	state	visibility	and	effectiveness	is	demonstrated,	while	on	the	
other	they	are	the	sites	in	which	state	legitimacy	is	contested.	This	struggle	can	best	be	seen	in	
conflicts	where	the	state	 is	at	 loggerheads	with	 local	 land	owners,	as	 in	the	case	of	both	the	
airport	and	military	base.	In	such	conflicts,	intermediary	non-state	institutions	such	as	the	Akils	
and	 elders	mediate	 between	 the	 actors	 in	 the	 conflict.	While	 people	may	 have	 leverage	 on	
















current	 highly	 corrupt	 judicial	 system.	 This	 creates	 dire	 security	 consequences	 for	 a	 town	
recovering	 from	 many	 years	 of	 poverty	 and	 civil	 war,	 which	 in	 turn	 cements	 the	 spatial	












debates	 in	 Somali/land	 are	 concentrated	 at	 the	 national	 and	 subnational	 level	 (i.e.,	 paying	
attention	to	regional	rather	than	urban	contexts).	Key	in	these	debates	are	the	discussions	on	
the	 intersection	 between	 peace	 and	 state-	 building.	 These	 have	 obscured	 rather	 than	
illuminated	the	urban	governance	dynamics	that	shape	segregation	of	cities	in	Somaliland.	The	
hybrid	national	order,	on	which	much	of	the	debate	is	focused,	failed	to	shift	the	country	away	
from	 past	malpractices	 (such	 as	 corruption,	 cronyism	 and	 nepotism	where	 one’s	 economic,	
political	and	social	belonging	 lies	at	 the	heart	of	access	 to	services).	This	cemented	the	clan-
based	spatial	characters	of	urban	spaces	in	Somaliland.	In	other	words,	as	hybrid	governance	
failed	to	present	the	people	with	an	alternative	form	of	belonging	based	on	aspirations	beyond	
clan.	 	 Rather,	 social	 networks	 based	 on	 clan	 remain	 prevalent	 in	 segregated	 urban	 spaces,	
reinforcing	 the	 clan	 as	 a	 prime	way	 in	which	 people	 seek	 to	 negotiate	 relations	 and	 service	
delivery	with	the	formal	state	institutions.		
This	 thesis	 thus	 provides	 greater	 understandings	 of	 the	 plurality	 of	 urban	 governance	









begged	 for	 urban	 level	 academic	 enquiry	 to	 complement	 the	 existing	 state-building	 and	
governance	debates	 in	Somaliland.	 	Finally,	 the	study	provides	an	 important	basis	 for	further	
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As	 shown	 in	 the	 rest	of	 the	 thesis,	 segregated	urban	 spaces	 can	have	major	 implications	 for	
urban	 governance	 in	 Somaliland.	 At	 the	 heart	 of	 these	 implications	 are	 the	 issues	 of	 state	
legitimacy	 and	 trust.	 The	 two	 are	 interdependent:	 for	 state	 legitimacy	 cannot	 be	 achieved	
without	laying	the	foundation	for	public	trust	in	the	state.	The	Somali	state-building	processes	
has	so	far	 failed	to	win	the	trust	of	the	public,	 resulting	 in	the	emergence,	development	and	
perpetuation	 of	 survival	 mechanisms	 (at	 the	 front	 of	 which	 stand	 segregation)	 aimed	 at	
negotiating	 life	 in	 unfavourable	 spaces	 governed	 by	 untrusted	 state.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	
segregation	might	 enable	 new	migrants	 to	 negotiate	 space	 (s)	 in	 the	 city	 through	 their	 clan	
networks	 and	enable	disadvantaged	 communities	 to	mobilise	people	and	 resources	 to	 resist	
against	 government	 policies	 which	 do	 not	 reflect	 their	 interests.	 But	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
segregated	 urban	 spaces	 might	 undermine	 security	 and	 political	 stability	 as	 they	 might	 be	
exploited	by	individuals	(mainly	elites)	hiding	behind	clan	identity	for	personal,	economic	and	
political	gains.		









to	 public	 services	 without	 being	mediated	 by	 intermediary	 institutions	 or	 persons.	 This	 will	
reduce	the	significance	and	incentive	of	one	locating	him/herself	in	a	neighbourhood	populated	
by	their	kinsmen	and	hence	cosmopolitan	spaces	are	likely	to	emerge.		
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¾ participate	 in	a	semi	structured	 interview	where	you	would	be	 interviewed	 individually	and	
could	also	be	re-interviewed.		
¾ participate	in	a	key	informant	interviews	and	you	would	be	interviewed	individually	and	could	
also	be	re-interviewed		
¾ participate	in	a	focus	group	discussion	where	you	will	participate	in	a	group	discussion	with	
other	participants.	
¾ share	documents	or	information	necessary	for	this	study.			
	
WHAT	HAPPENS	TO	MY	INFORMATION	AFTER	IT	HAS	BEEN	COLLECTED?	
The	information	collected	from	you	might	be:	
¾ used	for	research	purposes	only		
¾ shared	through	academic	forums		
¾ shared	through	academic	publications			
	
WHO	DO	I	CONTACT	FOR	MORE	INFORMATION	OR	IF	I	HAVE	CONCERNS?	
If	you	have	any	questions,	concerns	or	complaints	about	the	study	at	any	stage,	you	can	contact	the	
researcher	or	the	research	and	Enterprise	Co-Ordinator	at	the	School	of	Global	Studies:		
	
Abdifatah	Tahir	
Doctoral	Researcher		
Email:	a.i.tahir@sussex.ac.uk	
Tel:	+252634891188	
	
Or		
	
Mrs	Jayne	Paulin	
Research	and	Enterprise	Co-Ordinator		
Global	Studies,	Arts	C	C162			
Email:	J.E.Paulin@sussex.ac.uk	
Tel:	+44	1273	877107	
	
	
